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As we put more trust in the computer systems we use the need for se-
curity is increasing. And while security features like HTTPS are becoming
commonplace on the web, securing applications remains dicult. This thesis
focuses on analyzing dierent computer ecosystems to detect vulnerabilities
and develop countermeasures. This includes web browsers, web applications,
and cyber-physical systems such as Android Automotive.
For web browsers, we analyze how new security features might solve a
problem but introduce new ones. We show this by performing a systematic
analysis of the new Content Security Policy (CSP) directive navigate-to.
In our research, we nd that it does introduce new vulnerabilities, to which
we recommend countermeasures. We also create AutoNav, a tool capable of
automatically suggesting navigation policies for this directive.
To improve the security of web applications, we develop a novel black-
box method by combining the strengths of dierent black-box methods. We
implement this in our scanner Black Widow, which we compare with other
leading web application scanners. Black Widow both improves the cover-
age of the web application and nds more vulnerabilities, including ones in
Prestashop, WordPress, and HotCRP.
For embedded systems, We analyze the new attack vectors introduced by
combining a phone OS with vehicle APIs and nd new attacks pertaining to
safety, privacy, and availability. Furthermore, we create AutoTame, which is
designed to analyze third-party apps for vehicles for the vulnerabilities we
found.
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Whether you are doing online banking, using the web, or listening to
music in your car, you are relying on the underlying systems to work e-
ciently and securely. More and more services are moving online and privacy
concerns are increasing. At the same time, analyzing and improving security
is no easy task in large ecosystems such and the web or Android. To combat
this, we research and improve the security of the web browsers users use
to connect to the web and the web applications they interact with. And as
our cars become connected to the Internet and support the use of third-party
apps the attack surface, as well as the potential impact of vulnerabilities, in-
creases. We develop novel methods for nding vulnerabilities in these com-
plex ecosystems, mitigations for these problems and we implement them in
open-source tools that can be used by both industry and researchers.
Our research eorts can be divided into two major categories, web ap-
plications and embedded systems. For web applications we focus both on
the client-side, ensuring the security of the web browser, and the server-
side, ensuring the security of the application code running on the server. We
investigate the interplay between the client-side and the server-side in the
form of security policies. In the second paper [5] we research and improve a
recently proposed security policy, covering the interplay between client and
server. To help developers automatically generate these policies we created
AutoNav, an open-source tool capable of analyzing web sites and suggest-
ing policies. Improving the security of server-side code is the focus of the
third research paper [4]. Here we develop Black Widow, a black-box web ap-
plication scanner capable of nding more XSS vulnerabilities than previous
eorts. For embedded systems, we are interested in the security implications
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of porting a secure system, in this case Android, to new environments such
as vehicles. We explore this in the rst paper [3]. In addition, to exploring the
new attack surface and presenting new attacks, we also create AutoTame, a
static analysis tool able to nd apps exploiting the new vehicle-specic vul-
nerabilities we present.
1 Web applications
Any website you visit on the web can be considered a web application. When
you visit the website your web browser will send a request to the web ap-
plication, which will be handled by the application code running on the web
server. Once handled, the web application will respond with a complete web
page.
For a secure web, it is important to improve the security of both the web
browsers and web applications, as well as, the interaction between them.
The following sections will cover the multiple dierent attackers we consider
followed by the security concerns of both the client-side and the server-side
in more detail.
1.1 Aackers
The web is a complex ecosystem that allows attackers to use a multitude of
dierent attack vectors. To eciently protect against these attackers it is cru-
cial to understand their capabilities. The security literature [13] divides the
attackers into four classes of attackers, injection, gadget, web, and network
attackers.
Injection The injection attacker is the classic web application user. They
can interact with the application to perform available actions, for exam-
ple, comment on images, make their posts, leave reviews, etc. By carefully
choosing which actions to perform, the attacker might be able to inject their
JavaScript code into the web application. As the attacker is not part of the
website, this is considered a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attack.
Gadget A gadget is a third-party code that is willingly being included on
a website. Common examples are analytic scripts and frameworks, such as
jQuery. A gadget attacker is an attacker that can change the gadget code, thus
being able to attack multiple websites at the same time. Consider if mail.com
includes the script evil.com/analytics.js then a gadget attacker would
try to attack mail.com by changing the analytics.js code.
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Web The unique capability of the web attacker is that they can host their
website on the web. The attacker-controlled website can be used to redirect
users to malware or force users to send requests to other websites.
The attacker-controlled website evil.com can force a user to initiates a
request to mail.com. If the user is already authenticated with mail.com then
the attacker could potentially forge a request to delete all the user’s emails
on mail.com. This is known as a Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attack.
Network The nal and strongest attacker is a network attacker. There
are two types of network attackers, passive and active. A passive network
attacker is capable of listening to all the trac between the user and the
website, while an active network attacker can also modify the trac.
With this capability, the attacker can record passwords being sent to the
website for later account takeovers. In the case of a bank application, an
active network attacker would be able to change the recipient bank account
of a transaction while it is being sent to the website.
1.2 Client-side
The focus of client-side security is to ensure clients, like web browsers, are
protected from malicious web servers or, more commonly, web servers that
have been hijacked by attackers. We can use the CIA triad to dene security
as protecting the condentiality, integrity, and availability of services online.
This includes ensuring that a website, e.g. evil.com, is not able to read or
modify your emails at mail.com.
Consider the two rst requests in the listing below, line 3 and line 4.
A user visits evil.com and is then requested to fetch index from evil.com
(Line 3) and also from mail.com. It is the fundamental security feature Same-
Origin Policy (SOP) that decides to allow the rst and block the second. SOP
isolates dierent origins, where an origin is dened as a triplet of protocol
(e.g. http), host (e.g. evil.com), and port (e.g. 80). This means that evil.com
and mail.com are dierent origins and, as such, attempts to fetch data from
each other should be blocked by the browser, as shown by the red dashed line
in ??. There are some exceptions to this rule, for example, evil.com could
load images and scripts from mail.com (Line 5).
SOP helps protect condentiality as cross-origin data reads are blocked.
But SOP is not enough to protect integrity. Consider the POST request on line
6 in the code below where the browser is requested to send an email using
send_email.php on mail.com. If the client is authenticated to mail.com,
SOP will not block this request and an email can be sent. However, SOP will
still block the response. This type of attack is known as a Cross-site request
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forgery (CSRF). While this is commonly xed on the server-side, by including
special CSRF-tokens in requests, modern browsers are now stopping CSRF
by settings SameSite cookies to lax by default [10].
The nal action worth mentioning here is navigation. Although fetch and
POST are secured in modern browsers, evil.com can still forcefully navigate
a user to mail.com or some other web page hosting malicious or unwanted
content (Line 7). To solve this, the new CSP directive navigate-to was pro-
posed [15]. As the policy was a draft, and still is, it was the perfect opportu-
nity to research its impact on the web security ecosystem. The results of this
are presented in the second paper [5]. To better understand this ecosystem
the next section will cover the possible attacks.
1 host: evil.com
2
3 FETCH http://evil.com/index Allowed
4 FETCH http://mail.com/index Blocked
5 FETCH http://mail.com/img.jpg Allowed
6 POST http://mail.com/send_email.php Allowed
7 NAVIGATE http://mail.com/send_email.php Allowed
1.2.1 Attacks and Countermeasures
The most notorious client-side attack on the web is XSS. In this attack, evil
.com can execute JavaScript on mail.com, despite SOP. This is accomplished
by injected data which contains HTML, for example:
<script>alert(1)</script>. While any of the attackers in Section 1.1 can
launch this attack, the injection attacker and the web attacker are the most
common. If the web application on main.com is programmed incorrectly, it
might output this data as HTML code. In this case, this would result in the
JavaScript being executed and a popup being showed to the user. A more ma-
licious attacker could leverage this JavaScript execution to steal passwords
and other credentials. Although it is best to x the problem in the code on
the server-side, as we will explain Section 1.3, the browser can also help by
using CSP.
Content Security Policy (CSP) [16] is a mechanism for websites to dene
security policies that the browser will enforce. For example, websites can
dene a policy to only allow loading JavaScript from mail.com. Crucial for
XSS is that CSP can be used to block all inline JavaScript, which is the main
attack vector for XSS.
A newer type of client-side attack is navigation attacks. In a navigation
attack, users on mail.com could be redirected away to a malicious website
like evil.com. This happened in on Equifax in 2017 where their users were
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redirected to malware sites [1]. As mentioned in the previous section, the
CSP directive navigate-to is being developed as part of CSP Level 3 [15]
to mitigate navigation attacks. By using this new directive, Equifax could
dene the following policy to only allow navigations to their domain.
1 navigate-to: equifax.com
The navigate-to directive will protect against navigation attacks from all
the attackers in Section 1.1, except the network attacker. This is because an
network attacker could remove the policy in transit. To protect against this
the website should use HTTPS.
In the second paper [5] we research this new navigation policy to test
both if it introduces new vulnerabilities and what the performance impact
on the web is. We discover that it eciently protects against navigation at-
tack but also introduces new methods to probe users for private data. In
particular, the web attacker from Section 1.1 can abuse this policy gain in-
formation about the user visiting their website. To help the adaptation of
this new policy we develop AutoNav in the second paper [5]. AutoNav is
an open-source tool developers can use to scan their websites for outgoing
navigations, mostly hyperlinks, and then get suggested navigation policies.
1.3 Server-side
In contrast to client-side security, server-side security focuses on ensuring
the security of the server or the application. From the developer’s perspec-
tive, this means writing code without bugs that attackers can exploit. How-
ever, writing bugfree code is hard, as is evident by the billions of credentials
that have been stolen over the years due to poor security [9].
The following sections explain how web applications can be attacked
(Section 1.3.1) and how we can help developers nd and x bugs (Section 1.3.2).
1.3.1 Web application vulnerabilities
Many possible vulnerabilities can be present in web applications. OWASP’s
top 10 list [14] is a collection of the most critical web application vulnera-
bilities, with vulnerabilities ranging from injection attacks to authentication
misconguration and XSS. The work in this thesis mainly focuses on XSS as
it is both very prevalent and easy to exploit [14].
XSS vulnerabilities are caused by a web application reecting user input
as HTML code. Consider a forum where users, more formally an injection
attacker (Section 1.1), can post messages. If a user posts <b>hello</b> and
this is directly added to the HTML code produced by the application then the
5
Introduction
browser will interpret the <b> tag as HTML. This becomes more nefarious
if the user posts a message containing <script> tags, as this allows them
to execute JavaScript as the application. Using JavaScript attackers can steal
cookies and other valuable information.
Protecting against XSS is, in theory, simple. By converting the HTML
tag characters < and > with the escaped values &lt; and &gt;, a large portion
of XSS is solved. Depending on the precise context, other characters might
need escaping too, for example, quotes (") can be escaped as &quot;. In the
code below we see two examples where user input, $name, and $url, are
reected without any escaping. In these cases, an attacker could exploit this
to gain JavaScript execution.
1 SERVER-SIDE CODE => GENERATED HTML
2
3 Hello $name => Hello <script>alert(1)</script>
4 <a href="$url">link</a> => <a href="" onclick="alert(1)">link</a>
What makes XSS hard to detect in practice is that it is hard to know when
the data should be escaped for HTML. If the data is read from a database it
can be hard to determine for a developer if a malicious user could control
that data. Furthermore, escaping everything for HTML is not good either
as it can cause problems when exporting the data to non-HTML platforms.
This makes nding the vulnerabilities the major challenge of stopping XSS
attacks. Finding these vulnerabilities if the main focus of the third paper [4].
1.3.2 Finding vulnerabilities
No developer is perfect and sooner or later a mistake will lead to a poten-
tial vulnerability in the code. At this point, it is important to have systems
place to help nd these vulnerabilities. This can range from manual security
analysis to fully automatic code and application scanners.
Automatic scanning can be divided into two categories: white-box and
black-box. White-box analysis can be used if application artifacts, such as
source code, models, and code annotations, are available. In this case, the
scanner can analyze these artifacts to uncover vulnerabilities. When these
artifacts are not available, which is the standard case for penetration testing,
black-box scanning can be utilized instead.
Black-box scanning dynamically interacts with the application, similar
to how a user would. The scanner probes the application in dierent ways
while analyzing the responses from the application for vulnerable patterns.
For example, a black-box scanner can post <script>alert(1)</script>
to a forum and analyze the response for a JavaScript alert message. If this is
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detected it would support the hypothesis that the forum has an XSS vulner-
ability.
The main challenge of black-box scanning is how to interact with the web
application. Modern web applications have complicated workows where
combinations of links, form submissions, and JavaScript actions are required.
Additionally, the state of the web application is also important. For example,
a prerequisite for adding a product review could be to add a product. In this
case, the scanner would need to be able to add products before being able to
test the security of the review functionality.
Previous research in the eld of black-box scanners focused on one prob-
lem at a time. For example, the Jaek scanner focused on exploring JavaScript
events [12]. The Enemy-of-the-state instead put the focus on modelling the
state of the web applications [2]. In Black Widow [4] we combine the strengths
of previous scanners while minimizing their weaknesses, in combination
with novel detection methods for XSS vulnerabilities.
2 Embedded Systems
As embedded systems become more complex and allow for third-party code
to run, they too need to ensure client-side security. A great example of such a
system is Android. Android is a popular operating system for mobile phones.
While Android is mainly developed by Google, it also allows third-party de-
velopers to create and distribute apps on the Google Play store. By allowing
third-party apps users can quickly create and share their favorite apps with-
out having to wait for the rst-party company to develop them.
The downside with third-party apps is that it is hard to ensure that the
apps are not malicious or simply poorly implemented and vulnerable. The
main defense against apps stealing data or secretly recording your micro-
phone is permission.
Google is currently developing a new version of Android, named Android
Automotive, which will run in the infotainment systems of cars. Android Au-
tomotive provides an excellent chance to research the security implications
of porting a relatively secure platform, Android on phone, to work in a new
ecosystem of embedded systems in cars. This is the topic of the rst paper [3].
Before explaining the security of Android Automotive, let us rst explore
the general security mechanisms in Android, the new features in Android




If an Android app wants to access your camera, microphone, or location,
for example, then the app must ask for permission to use this. The main
two permission types in Android are normal and dangerous [8]. Lower im-
pact APIs, such as Internet access or vibration control only requires normal
permissions. These permissions are granted when the user installs the app.
For more critical APIs, such as location, the dangerous permission are used.
When an app tries to access such an API the user will receive a pop-up in
which they have to grant the app access.
2.2 Android Automotive
Android Automotive [7] is a standalone version of Android which is designed
to be used in vehicles. The operating system is used in the vehicle’s infotain-
ment system, usually a unit in the middle of the dashboard with a touch-
screen. The infotainment system is responsible for presenting information,
such as maps and location, as well as entertainment such as music and radio.
Android Automotive introduces new APIs to control the vehicle’s heat-
ing, ventilation, and air conditioning system (HVAC). It also enables apps to
read sensor data including speed, temperature, and engine RPM.
2.3 Aack surface in vehicles
As the connectivity of the infotainment systems is increasing with new fea-
tures like Internet connectivity, WiFi, Bluetooth, and third-party code run-
ning locally, the attack surface is ever increasing. We have seen previous
attacks on infotainment systems where attackers were able to take over a
2014 Jeep Cherokee by exploiting the Uconnect system [11].
Many of the low-level systems, both in Android Automotive and the ve-
hicles, are already well explored. Communication protocols like WiFi and
Bluetooth and tried and tested implementations. Similarly, the internal sys-
tems in the vehicle isolated into dierent networks with rewalls between,
ensuring that the infotainment system cannot send break commands or turn
o the engine.
No solution is perfect and researching how to break the internal re-
walls and communication protocol implementations would be interesting.
However, the target for the rst research paper [3] was to identify what An-
droid Automotive apps can do within the specication. That is, what attacks




2.4 Aacks and Countermeasures
The attacks I’ve found in the research on Android Automotive can be divided
into three categories, disturbance, availability, and privacy attacks.
Disturbance attacks is a novel vector since it targets a new asset, the
attention of the driver. Android was not designed with this in mind since it
is not critical what the user focuses on. In the rst paper [3] we demonstrate
how malicious apps can take over the stereo and play music on max volume
while simultaneously overriding user input to turn down the volume. To
counter this we develop AutoTame, a set of static analysis methods that can
detect Android Automotive apps using dangerous APIs.
Availability attacks focus on acquiring as much system resources as pos-
sible, rendering other apps and the system itself unusable. A classic availabil-
ity attack is the Fork Bomb which has been demonstrated to work on classic
Android previously [6]. In a phone, the impact of such an attack is quite
limited, simply reboot the phone and it is back to normal. However, for the
infotainment system, which is used for navigation, having the user trying to
gure out how to reboot or having to pull over to x it is more severe. This
problem is best solved on the OS level by limiting the number of processes
an app can spawn, similar to how most desktop operating systems solve it.
As a short term mitigation, we also develop static analysis methods to detect
apps trying to abuse this.
Finally, privacy attacks try to gain and exltrate sensitive information.
There are many interesting methods for abusing other apps, for example, an
app without Internet permission can ask the web browser to open a URL to
leak data. This is known as the confused deputy problem. In our research, we
found that the default music player in Android Automotive was able to exl-
trate without giving any visual clues to the user. We also found new meth-
ods for acquiring sensitive information. In particular, Android Automotive
allows apps to read sensor data like gear and RPM, which can be combined
to calculate the velocity. This is signicant since reading the gear and RPM
does not require any permissions while reading the velocity requires elevated
permissions. To counter this combinable sensors values should also require
the app to request permissions.
Thesis structure
Paper 1: On the Road with Third-Party Apps: Security Analysis of an
In-Vehicle App Platform [3]
This paper aims to uncover new security vulnerabilities and attack vectors
from the porting of Android to the vehicle-specic Android Automotive. We
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systematically investigate the attack surface of locally running third-party
apps in vehicles. We present new attack vectors with the focus on disturb-
ing the driver, potentially aecting road safety. We implement these attacks
and test them both in Android Automotive emulators and physical testbeds
supplied by Volvo Cars. To mitigate the problems we nd we suggest en-
hancements to the permission model and improved API control. In addition,
we develop AutoTame, for code analysis of vehicle-specic applications.
Statement of contributions This paper was in collaboration with Jonas
Groth and Andrei Sabelfeld. Benjamin was responsible for nding and eval-
uating the attacks, designing the countermeasures and creating AutoTame.
Appeared in: Proceedings of the International Conference on Vehicle Tech-
nology and Intelligent Transport Systems (VEHITS), 2019.
Paper 2: AutoNav: Evaluation and Automatization of Web Navigation
Policies [5]
This paper performs a rst investigation of the new navigate-to CSP di-
rective. We systematically analyze the potential vulnerabilities introduced
by navigate-to with respect to the full web ecosystem. We demonstrate
multiple attacks such as detecting if users are logged in to dierent websites,
probing active shopping carts and bypassing third-party cookie blocking. We
propose multiple countermeasures to these problems by enhancing the spec-
ication, browser implementations and web development practices. To aid
web developers in adapting this new policy we develop the black-box scanner
AutoNav. AutoNav can automatically crawl a website and infer navigation
policies. We also introduce a simplication and wildcard algorithm to allow
developers to easily optimize policies for performance or security. We eval-
uate AutoNav and the viability of navigate-to by an empirical study on
Alexa’s top 10,000 websites.
Statement of contributions This was a collaboration with Andrei Sabelfeld.
Benjamin was responsible for analyzing the potential vulnerabilities, design-
ing and implementing AutoNav, and performing the evaluation.
Appeared in: Proceedings of the Web Conference (WWW), 2020.
Paper 3: Black Widow: black-box Data-driven Web Scanning [4]
In this paper we improve the state-of-the-art in web application vulnerability
scanning by designing a black-box scanner by using a novel combination of
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black-box scanning techniques. We analyze the main challenges black-box
scanners face in terms of vulnerability detection and code coverage. Based
on this we develop Black Widow, a data-driven web scanner capable of fol-
lowing complex workows and interact with JavaScript events. We evaluate
our scanner on 10 web applications, including Drupal, HotCRP, Prestashop
and WordPress, and show that our scanner improves code coverage by be-
tween 63% and 280% compared to the other scanners. In addition, we also
nd more XSS vulnerabilities than other scanners, including some in mod-
ern production software, including HotCRP, osCommerce, PrestaShop and
WordPress.
Statement of contributions This paper was written in collaboration with
Giancarlo Pellegrino and Andrei Sabelfeld. Benjamin was responsible for de-
veloping the new scanning method, designing and implementing the method
in Black Widow and performing the evaluation.
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On the Road with Third-
Party Apps: Security Anal-
ysis of an In-Vehicle App
Platform
Benjamin Eriksson, Jonas Groth, Andrei Sabelfeld
VEHITS 2019
Abstract. Digitalization has revolutionized the automotive indus-try. Modern cars are equipped with powerful Internet-connected
infotainment systems, comparable to tablets and smartphones. Re-
cently, several car manufacturers have announced the upcoming possi-
bility to install third-party apps onto these infotainment systems. The
prospect of running third-party code on a device that is integrated into
a safety critical in-vehicle system raises serious concerns for safety, se-
curity, and user privacy. This paper investigates these concerns of in-
vehicle apps. We focus on apps for the Android Automotive operating
system which several car manufacturers have opted to use. While the
architecture inherits much from regular Android, we scrutinize the ad-
equateness of its security mechanisms with respect to the in-vehicle
setting, particularly aecting road safety and user privacy. We inves-
tigate the attack surface and vulnerabilities for third-party in-vehicle
apps. We analyze and suggest enhancements to such traditional An-
droid mechanisms as app permissions and API control. Further, we in-
vestigate operating system support and how static and dynamic analy-
sis can aid automatic vetting of in-vehicle apps. We develop AutoTame,
a tool for vehicle-specic code analysis. We report on a case study of
the countermeasures with a Spotify app using emulators and physical
test beds from Volvo Cars.

1 INTRODUCTION
The modern infotainment system, often consisting of a unit with a touch-
screen, is mainly used for helping the driver navigate, listening to music or
making phone calls. In addition to this, many users wish to use their favorite
smartphone apps in their cars. Thus, several car manufacturers, including
Volvo, Renault, Nissan and Mitsubishi [42, 50], have chosen to use a special
version of Android for use in cars, called Android Automotive [19]. Other
manufacturers such as Volkswagen [49] and Mercedes-Benz [31] are instead
developing their new in-house infotainment systems. In contrast to the in-
house alternatives, Android Automotive is an open platform with available
information and code. This justies our focus on Android Automotive apps.
Android Automotive For the manufacturers, a substantial benet of us-
ing an operating system based on Android is gained from relying on third-
party developers to provide in-vehicle apps. A multitude of popular apps
already exists on the Android market, which can be naturally converted into
Android Automotive apps. Further, Android Automotive is a stand-alone
platform that does not require a connected smartphone, contrary to its com-
petitors MirrorLink [34], Apple CarPlay [1] and Android Auto [17].
Safety, security, and privacy challenges While third-party apps boost
innovation, they raise serious concerns for safety, security, and user privacy.
Indeed, it is of paramount importance that the platform both safely handles
these apps while driving and also safeguards the user’s privacy-sensitive in-
formation against leakage to third parties. Figure 1.1 gives a avor of real-life
safety concerns, by showing a user comment on a radio app with almost half
a million downloads. The user points out that they had to stop driving when a
shockingly loud ad was suddenly played, adding that ads “shouldn’t attempt
to kill you” [51].
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Figure 1.1: Top comment on a radio app. A user was shocked by the volume
of an ad and had to stop driving.
While the Android Automotive architecture inherits much from regular
Android, a key question is whether its security mechanisms are adequate
for in-vehicle apps. However, compared to the setting of a smartphone, in-
vehicle apps have obvious safety-critical constraints, such as neither being
able to tamper with the control system nor being able to distract the driver.
Further, car sensors provide sources of private information, such as location
and speed or sound from the in-vehicle microphone. In fact, voice controls
are encouraged for apps in infotainment systems, as to help keep the driver’s
hands on the wheel, opening up for audio snooping on users by malicious
apps. A recent experiment done by GM collected location data and radio
listening habits from its users with the goal of creating targeted radio ads [8].
This clearly highlights the value of user data in vehicles. Similar data could
potentially be collected by apps using the radio API to record the current
station [15]. Thus, a key question is whether Android’s security mechanisms
are adequate for in-vehicle apps.
Android Permissions Android’s core security mechanism is based on a
permission model [21]. This model forces apps to request permissions be-
fore using the system resources. Sensitive resources such as camera and GPS
require the user to explicitly grant them before the app can use them. In
contrast, more benign resources such as using the Internet or NFC can be
granted during installation. However, there are several limitations of this
model with implications for the in-vehicle setting. From a user’s perspec-
tive, these permissions are often hard to understand. Porter Felt et al. [40]
show that less than a fth of users pay attention to the permissions when in-
stalling an app, and even a smaller fraction understands the implications of
granting them. Understanding the implications of giving permissions is even
harder. There are immediate privacy risks, such as an app having permission
to access the car’s position and the Internet can potentially leak location to
any third party. More advanced attacks would only need access to the vehicle
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speed. This may not seem like a privacy issue but by knowing the starting
position, likely the user’s home address, and speed, it is possible to derive
the path that the car drives [16].
Analyzing Android Automotive Security To the best of our knowledge,
this is the rst paper to analyze application-level security on the Android
Automotive infotainment system. To assess the security of the Android Au-
tomotive app platform, we need to extend the scope beyond the traditional
permissions.
Attack surface For a systematic threat analysis, we need to analyze the
attack surface available to third-party apps. This includes analyzing what
eects malicious apps may have on the functions of the car, such as climate
control or cruise control, and on the driver. We demonstrate SoundBlast,
representative of disturbance attacks, where a malicious app can shock the
driver by excessive sound volume, for example, upon reaching high speed.
We also demonstrate availability attacks like Fork bomb and Intent storm
which render the infotainment system unusable until it is rebooted. Further,
we explore attacks related to the privacy of sensitive information, such as
vehicle location and speed, as well as in-vehicle voice sound. We show how
to exltrate location and voice sound information to third parties. In order
to validate the feasibility of the attacks, we demonstrate the attacks in a sim-
ulation environment obtained from Volvo Cars. Based on the attacks, we
derive exploitable vulnerabilities and use the Common Vulnerability Scoring
System (CVSS) [13] to assess their impact.
To address these vulnerabilities, we suggest countermeasures of permis-
sions, API control, system support, and program analysis.
Permissions We identify several improvements of the permission model.
This includes both introducing missing permissions, such as those, pertain-
ing to the location and the sound system in the car, as well as making some
permissions more ne-grained. For location, there are ways to bypass the
location permission by deriving the location from IP addresses. At the same
time, the location permission currently allows all or nothing: either sharing
highly accurate position information or not. The former motivates adding
missing permissions, while the latter motivates making permissions more
ne-grained. We argue that for many apps, like Spotify or weather apps,
low-precision in the location, e.g. city-level, suces.
API control In contrast to permissions, API control can use more informa-
tion when decided to grant an app access to a resource. For example, using
high-precision data could be allowed only once an hour, or during an activ-
ity like running. Our ndings reveal that apps currently need access to the
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microphone in order to use voice controls. We deem this as breaking the
principle of least privilege [44]. To address this, we argue for full mediation,
so that apps subscribe to voice commands mediated by the operating system,
rather than having access to the microphone. Similarly, location data can also
be mediated to limit the precision and frequency of location requests, making
it possible to adhere to the principle of least privilege. These scenarios ex-
emplify countermeasures we suggest to improve API controls for in-vehicle
apps.
System We argue for improvements to the operating system in order to
protect against apps using too much of the system’s resources. Malicious
apps can cause the system to become unresponsive or halt, either by recur-
sively creating new processes or coercing other system processes to use up
all the resources. The countermeasures consist of limiting the number of re-
quests an app can make, limiting the resources system processes can use, or
completely blocking some capabilities for third-party apps, like creating new
processes.
Code analysis While previous methods protect the device from malicious
apps, our vision is to also be able to stop the apps before they make it to the
device. This can be accomplished by analyzing the code in the app store, be-
fore the app is published. This does not only protect against malicious apps
but also poorly written apps that fail to adhere to security best practices.
This could, for example, include apps not using encryption for data trans-
missions, which is currently a big problem [41]. Other problems include
vulnerable apps with high privileges being exploited by malicious apps or
colluding malicious apps sharing data over covert channels. Thus, we inves-
tigate how static and dynamic program analysis can be leveraged to address
the vulnerabilities.
We design and develop AutoTame, our own static analysis tool for detect-
ing dangerous use of APIs, including the new automotive APIs. AutoTame is
open source and will be freely available at the time of publication. Further, we
explore several state-of-the-art techniques, based on tools like FlowDroid [3]
and We are Family [4].
Threat model The threat model in this paper denes the attacker as be-
ing able to install one or more apps, with the victim’s permission, on their
infotainment system. Similar to previous research [45], we assume that the
victim is more inclined to install an app that asks for fewer permissions. This
means that, while one app with access to both Internet and GPS might be con-
sidered suspicious, two apps, one with access to the Internet, the other with
access to GPS, would be more acceptable. Such a model incentivizes apps
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to collude and share information over covert channels. Using this model we
analyze how much damage can be done by a user mistakenly installing ma-
licious apps.
Case study An ideal evaluation of our countermeasures would be a large-
scale of apps from an app store, in the style of the studies on Google Play,
e.g. [3, 10, 37]. Unfortunately, Android Automotive is at this stage an emerg-
ing technology with no apps yet publicly available for a study of this kind.
Nevertheless, we have been granted access to Infotainment Head Unit emu-
lators and physical test beds from Volvo Cars allowing us to perform a case
study with an in-vehicle app version of Spotify. We use this infrastructure to
evaluate our countermeasures.
Impact At the same time, an early study of Android Automotive security
has its advantages. Because our analysis comes at an early phase of Android
Automotive adoption by car manufacturers, it has higher chances for im-
pact. We have reported our ndings to both Volvo Cars that participated in
our experiments and Google. We are in contact with both on closing the vul-
nerabilities we point out and on experimenting with the countermeasures.
Contributions The paper oers the following contributions:
• We present an attack surface for third-party in-vehicle apps, identify-
ing classes of disturbance, availability, and privacy attacks (Section 3).
• We propose countermeasures, based on ne-grained permissions, API
control, system support, and information ow (Section 4).
• We overview prominent representatives of techniques and tools for de-
tecting security and privacy violations in third-party apps (Section 4.4).
• We present our own static analysis tool, AutoTame, for detection of
dangerous API usage (Section 4.4).
• We evaluate the countermeasures on a case study with the in-vehicle
app Spotify (Section 5).
2 BACKGROUND
As cars become more connected and their infotainment systems more pow-
erful, people expect the car to interact in a seamless way with their other
devices. In contrast to most other personal devices, a software bug in a car
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can have lethal consequences. For example, in 2015 Miller and Valasek [33]
showed that it was possible to remotely take over a 2014 Jeep Cherokee by
exploiting their infotainment system Uconnect. More recently, in May 2018,
researchers found multiple vulnerabilities in the infotainment system and
Telematics Control Unit of BMW cars which made it possible to gain control
of the CAN buses in the vehicle [48]. These type of attacks show that remote
take over attacks of connected vehicles is a possibility and a real threat.
Attackers do not necessarily need to take control over the braking or
steering system to endanger or distract the driver. For example, an attacker
can make a malicious infotainment app that disturbs or shocks the driver at
a certain speed level. In order to shock the driver, the app may, for example,
play loud music or rapidly ash the screen.
In addition to security, privacy is also a concern as cars become more
capable of collecting data about their users. In accordance with the new EU
regulation, GDPR [11], the user has to be informed about how the data is used
and agree to their data being used in the described way. Previous research
projects have explored the possibility to automatically track and analyze how
privacy-sensitive information is leaked from Android apps [43], either delib-
erately through advertisement networks or inadvertently through insecure
communication means [41].
2.1 Experimental Setup
With access to Volvo Cars internal testing equipment, both the attacks and
countermeasures were tested on their infrastructure. In particular, the code
is tested on Volvo’s Infotainment Head Unit emulators (IHU) emulators and
physical test beds. All of the Android code is developed for Android SDK
version 26 and 27, which corresponds to Android 8.0 and 8.1.
2.2 Automatic analysis of Android apps
Automatically analyzing Android apps can be done through two major strate-
gies, static analysis or dynamic analysis. Static analysis only considers the
code while in dynamic analysis the code is executed and the program’s be-
havior is analyzed. Which ever method is chosen, a decision on what to look
for in the analysis has to be made. In this paper, two tracks are evaluated,





Today, the Android system is ocially used in all types of devices, from
phones and tablets to watches, TVs and soon cars [18]. Android Automo-
tive is a version of Android developed specically for use in cars. It is essen-
tially Android with a User Interface (UI) adapted for cars and a number of car
specic APIs. The car specic APIs allow for control over vehicle functions,
such as the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC), and reading of
sensor data, e.g. speed, temperature and engine RPM [19]. Android Automo-
tive is not be confused with Android Auto which is already available on the
market today. Unlike Android Auto, Automotive is a completely stand-alone
system that is not dependent on a smartphone. In Android Auto, apps run
on the users Android phone which then renders content on a screen in the
car. The apps and the Android system thus runs separated from the car.
2.4 Android’s Permission model
The Android operating system controls access to many parts of the system,
such as camera, position and text messages, through permissions. These per-
missions can be of one of four types; normal, dangerous, signature or signa-
tureOrSystem. The rst two are the most common and can be granted to any
third-party app. Normal permissions give isolated accesses with minimal
risk for the system and user, these are automatically granted by the oper-
ating system. Dangerous permissions, on the other hand, give accesses to
private user data and control over the device that may harm the user. These
permissions have to be explicitly granted by the user on a per application
basis. Both Android’s coarse and ne location permissions are examples of
dangerous permissions, since both supply high precision data. The dier-
ence between them is that ne location has access to the GPS while coarse
uses cell towers and WiFi access points. Finally, there are the signature and
signatureOrSystem permissions, which requires the app to be pre-installed or
cryptographically signed [20].
2.5 Covert channels
A covert channel, as dened by Lampson, is a communication channel be-
tween two entities that are not intended for information transfer [25]. In
Android, a number of dierent covert channels exist that use both hardware
attributes and software functions to communicate. Apps can for example
communicate by reading and setting the volume, sending special intents or
cause high and low system load [29, 45].
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Table 1.1: The attacks are divided into three dierent categories. Which asset and permissions the attacks aects and
requires are listed along with the needed user interaction.
Name Category Asset User interaction Permission Severity
SoundBlast Disturbance Driver’s attention Start app None Mediuma
Fork bomb DoS CPU resources Start app None Medium
Intent storm DoS CPU resources Start app None Medium
Permissionless speed Privacy Current speed Start app None Low
Permissionless exltration Privacy Data Exltration Start app None Low
Covert channel Privacy Data Exltration Start app Channel dependent Low
a The score is subject to the limitation of CVSS3 on lacking support for physical damage and safety risks [9].
3 ATTACKS
This section focuses on the implementation decisions regarding the attacks
presented in Table 1.1. The category and asset columns in the table give an
understanding of what the attack is targeting. More specically, the asset is
what the attack is trying to take control over. In the case of denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks, this is usually some type of resource. Privacy attacks, on the
other hand, try to acquire and exltrate data such as speed or location. User
interaction and permission are used to judge how easy the attack is to ex-
ecute. The values are nally combined to create a severity score based on
the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS3) [13]. A shortcoming of
CVSS3 is that possible physical damage or safety risks are not considered in
the scoring. Distraction vulnerabilities, like the one exploited by SoundBlast,
and other automotive vulnerabilities will be underrated. These shortcomings
are currently being revised for CVSS3.1 [9]. The exact vectors and scores for
each attack are presented in Table 1.3. Table 1.2 present the same attacks
together with suitable countermeasures to mitigate the underlying vulnera-
bilities.
3.1 Disturbance
SoundBlast The SoundBlast attack relies heavily on the AudioManager
class in Android. This class supplies functions which are used to control
the volume of dierent audio streams in Android. Cars also have the more
specic CarAudioManager, however, this class requires special permissions.
Dierent audio streams are used to dierentiate between volumes, e.g. mu-
sic volume, ringer volume, alarm volume, etc. A malicious app can use the
permissonless audio API to max the volume and shock the driver. The attack
is further improved by using a ContentObserver to listen for changes in
volume and force the volume to the maximum as soon as it changes. Using
the vehicle’s sensors, the attacker can also design the attack to only active
when traveling at high speeds.
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Testing the SoundBlast attack shows that it is possible to set any volume
on all the dierent audio streams in Android, without needing any permis-
sions. In addition, the attack can also detect changes in volume and max the
volume accordingly. The changes are also detected even if the driver uses
the hardware controls on the IHU or steering wheel. Killing the app is the
only way to regain control of the volume.
3.2 Availability
Fork bomb A fork bomb is a program that creates new instances of itself
until the system runs out of resources, either freezing the device or force a
reboot. While this might be acceptable on a phone, in a vehicle setting this is
problematic. Since the IHU usually handles navigation, freezing the device
might distract drivers trying to x it, or frustrate them by having to stop and
reboot.
Forking in Android is not possible by default, resulting in the need for a
vulnerability to leverage in order to accomplish forking. Unlike previously
successful fork bomb attacks on Android [2], our attack takes an application-
level approach by creating a shell, which in turn has the power to fork itself.
Similar to other programming languages, Android also supports a version
of exec, which can be used to run external programs. However, this is not
enough to create a new process that can copy itself. By using exec to run
sh -s, a new shell is created, which in turn can execute the fork bomb.
When testing this attack it is able to fully grind both the emulator and
test bed to a halt, requiring a power cycle to regain control. It is thus able to
render the infotainment system unusable until the system is rebooted.
Intent storm The intent storm attack uses Android intents to continu-
ously restart the app itself. Similar to the fork bomb presented in section 3.2,
the intent storm attack tries to use up all the CPU resources, making the IHU
unusable. The dierence, however, is that the intent storm does not use the
resources itself, but rather forces another system process, the system_server,
to use up all resources. The fast activity switching required is made possi-
ble with threads and intents. As soon as the app starts, it spins up 8 threads
which all ask Android to start its own main activity. Using multiple threads
increases the pressure on the system_server, making the device less respon-
sive.
During the tests, the system_server process was forced by the attack to
use 100% of the CPU, making the IHU unusable. In some cases, an error
message popped up on the device prompting the user to either kill or wait
for the app. Regardless of which alternative was picked, the attack would
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continue without interruption since a request to restart the app had already
been sent. Similar to the fork bomb in section 3.2, this would grind the IHU
to a halt. However, in some cases, the IHU would automatically restart after
a few minutes.
3.3 Privacy
Permissionless speed In Android Automotive, apps have direct access to
the current speed. However, since speed is privacy sensitive it requires a
permission. By combining other permissionless sensor values, such as the
current RPM and gear, and knowledge about the wheel size, the speed can
be derived. The eectiveness of this attack does depend on the sampling
frequency of the sensors. The hardware test beds only contained the IHU
and not the full car, meaning that the eciency of the attack is yet to be
tested.
Permissionless exltraion The Android permission model clearly states
that any app wanting communicate on a network requires Internet permis-
sion. However, by using intents it is possible to force another app with Inter-
net permission to leak the data. Depending on how the intent is crafted, dif-
ferent apps will handle them, for example, the web browser will open URLs,
music player opens music les, etc.
While the implementation details dier depending on which app handles
the intent, the common procedure is to encode the data, split it into chunks
and send a separate intent for each chunk.
While the default web browser can be used, there are better options for
exltrating data. By changing the data type to audio/wav and using the
URL http://evil.com/music.wav?d=[data], the music player will load
the URL instead. The stealthiness of this method depends on which music
player is used. Using the native Android music player, a small popup with a
play button will appear. By returning a malformed wav le from the server,
the music player will show a more subtle error message.
If a web browser is used, the attacker can have the server redirect the
request to a deep link, giving control back to the exltration app. Not only
does this give the app the ability to leak more data, but it also enables two-
way communication with the attacker’s server, all without using the Internet
permission.
In order to test this, a proof-of-concept code was developed that would
record audio for ve seconds and then upload it using the described method.
The code only needs permission to record audio, but not to use the Internet.
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Testing this attack shows that it is possible to send data to the Internet with-
out using the Internet permission. The attack was successful using Chrome,
the standard music player, video player and image viewer. If the device has
not been congured with a default application for opening the type of data,
it will ask the user to pick one.
Covert channels Previous work on covert channels in Android have used
both vibration and volume settings to transmit data between colluding apps [45].
While these are still viable in Android Automotive, there are also additional
new interesting APIs. In particular the new climate control API for tem-
perature. Since the temperature is represented by a oating point value, the
bandwidth is more than tenfold that of the volume settings. However, chang-
ing the temperature does currently require a signature permission, making
it hard for third-party apps to acquire.
In contrast to previous work on covert channels, which relied on time
synchronization, our attack is based on asynchronous messages. This forces
the receiver to send an acknowledgment for each of the received values.
While this lowers the bit rate, in contrast to synchronous communication,
it greatly increases the reliability of the communication.
With this implementation, two apps can collude to leak privacy- sensi-
tive information to the Internet. One app requests permission to privacy-
sensitive information but not the Internet and then acts as a sender. The
second app requests Internet permission but not permission to access any
sensitive data. The second app can now receive sensitive information which
it does not have permission for and leak it to the Internet.
4 COUNTERMEASURES
The vulnerabilities are very dierent in nature and, as such, the mitigation
techniques dier. Some vulnerabilities can be mitigated by several dierent
techniques while others can only be mitigated by one. An overview of the
attacks together with mitigations for the underlying vulnerabilities are pre-
sented in Table 1.2.
4.1 Permission
The current permission model can be improved both by adding new per-
missions for unprotected resources, and also by rening some very broad
permission. The SoundBlast attack, from Section 3.1, relies on changing the
volume through an API calledAudioManager which does not require any sort
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of permission. At the same time, there exists an API calledCarAudioManager,
which does require a permission. Cars usually have more advanced sound
systems than phones so a dierent API with more settings does make sense
as does the need for a permission. Still, when conducting experiments with
the emulator the AudioManager is present and usable by third-party apps,
thus allowing an attacker to circumvent the permission required by CarAu-
dioManager.
In addition to audio, Android allows apps to get the location of the de-
vice by using GPS. This can, for example, be used by apps to give weather
information. However, due to these systems having high precision and al-
lowing for multiple requests within short time intervals, apps often excessive
information.
There are multiple methods for preserving the user’s privacy while still
maintaining an acceptable level of functionality in apps using location [12,
32]. Which method is optimal is highly dependent on the type of information
the app needs. A simple approach is to truncate location, eectively creating
a grid of possible locations. A grid will better protect the privacy of the user,
but at the same time degrade the functionality of some apps [32]. In order to
handle apps like tness trackers, which requires fast updates and high pre-
cision, truncation is not feasible. Fawaz and Shin [12] argue that in order
to preserve privacy, a choice has to be made between tracking distance and
speed, or tracking the path of the exercise. They present a method for track-
ing the distance and speed by supplying the exercise tracker with a synthetic
route, that has correct distance and speed but a forged path. Furthermore,
they argue that navigation apps with Internet access, usually used for real-
time trac information, are the hardest to handle since they can potentially
leak the location. This problem could be solved by using state-of- the-art
information ow tracking to ensure that the location is never leaked.
4.2 API control
In some scenarios, permissions are not enough. This is usually the case when
access to a resource can be abused over time. For example, in the current
Android model, apps are allowed to record audio from the microphone at all
times, as long as it has been granted the permission once. This means that a
restaurant app that uses voice commands to nd close by restaurants, can lis-
ten to everything the user says, at all times. Since voice commands are more
prevalent in vehicles, where the user’s focus is on driving, it is reasonable
to believe that more in-vehicle apps will use this functionality. One solution
to this problem is to use a voice mediator, which is a special service that
has access to the microphone and allows for third-party apps to subscribe
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to certain keywords. The app would only receive sentences that contain the
keywords it subscribed to, eectively removing its capabilities to eavesdrop.
Similar to the voice mediation, the same method can be used for location. By
using a location mediator apps can subscribe to arbitrary precision for loca-
tion data. The mediator can also introduce a trade-o between the refresh
rate and precision of the requests, mitigating real-time tracking.
4.3 System
Some problems are best solved at the operating system level. These problems
include resource management, e.g. how much CPU time or memory an app
should be allowed to use. One method of limiting the impact of availability
attacks is by limiting how frequent a resource can be acquired. Android al-
ready does this to a great extent when it comes to memory and CPU usage
by third-party apps. However, some system processes, the system_server pro-
cess in particular, can use all of the CPU, eectively starving the rest of the
system. This lack of rate limiting was exploited in the intent storm attack in
Section 3.2. While not tested, we speculate that this vulnerability could either
be countered by rate limiting the CPU usage of the system_server process or
limit incoming intents to the system_server.
Similar to CPU limiting, memory usage requires limitations too. When
Android is running low on memory it will start to terminate apps in the
background. This can sometimes result in the termination of apps that the
user wants to run in the background. In the case of vehicles, navigation
apps are a good example of apps that should not be killed of while driving.
A possible method for ensuring that the navigation works while driving is
to prohibit Android from terminating important apps. This protects against
both malicious apps using up the memory, and legitimate memory hungry
apps.
Akin to permissions, SELinux policies are policies which limit what the
processes in an OS can do. These policies play a crucial role in protecting
the vehicle’s subsystems from Android. The policies are also suitable for
specifying what an app is allowed to do. However, not how many times it
can do it. As Bratus et al. [5] explains, “SELinux does not provide an easy
way to control the use of the fork operation once forking has been allowed
in the program’s prole”, which shows that SELinux is not suited to stop
attacks like fork bombing. While it might be infeaseable in many situations,
blocking forking altogether could be a solution.
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4.4 Code analysis
Automatic analysis techniques can be used to scan apps, both before instal-
lation and during runtime, to nd vulnerabilities and block attacks. In the
following sections tools using these techniques are described in more detail.
Vulnerability detection Both AndroBugs [26] and QARK [27] are tools
that can be used to scan Android apps for known vulnerabilities. QARK is ca-
pable of nding many common security vulnerabilities in Android apps [22].
QARK can, for example, nd incorrect usage of cryptographic functions,
trace intents and detect insecure broadcasts. In addition, QARK can also
generate exploits for some of these vulnerabilities. While not able to gen-
erate exploits, AndroBugs can detect vulnerabilities based on heuristics in
the code. For example, multiple dex les suggests a master key vulnerability
(CVE-2013-4787) [35]. The tools work well together since AndroBugs can
quickly scan multiple apps with heuristics and then QARK can perform a
deeper analysis of the interesting apps.
AutoTame To scan for dangerous use of the new automotive APIs, we de-
veloped a special tool built on the Soot framework, which can analyze both
Java and Android bytecode. The tool has a list of dangerous APIs, e.g con-
trolling the HVAC system, change audio volume or spawning shells. Using
Soot, our tool decompiles the APK and analyses each function in the app
while testing if it matches any of the ones in the list. AutoTame performs a
full application analysis. The main advantage of this is that it does not re-
quire any entry point analysis. Compared to many other languages, Android
apps do not have a single main function from which execution starts. There-
fore a full analysis ensures that any dangerous use of an API is detected.
However, without knowing the entry points, dead code could be agged, po-
tentially leading to false positives. In addition to only detecting if the volume
is changed, AutoTame can also give extra warnings if the volume is set to a
high numeric value or if getStreamMaxVolume is used. If a match is found
the app can be removed or marked as potentially dangerous. The tool was
able to ag the SoundBlast attack, as well as the fork bomb.
Taint tracking Taint tracking can help detect privacy leaks where sensi-
tive information, such as the user’s location, is being sent to a remote server.
FlowDroid [3] is a tool for static taint analysis on Android, that can detect
these ows. The taint analysis works by tainting private sources of infor-
mation, such as the user’s location. If the location is written to a variable,
then this variable also becomes tainted. If at a later time this tainted variable
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Table 1.2: List of all developed attacks and which countermeasure(s) can be
used to mitigate each attack the underlying vulnerabilities.
Attacks / Countermeasures Permissions Location granularity SELinux AutoTame FlowDroid We are Family Rate limit
SoundBlast X X
Fork bomb X X
Intent Storm X
Permissionless speed X X X
Permissionless exltration X X X
Covert channels X X X X
is written to a public sink, e.g an Internet connection, a leak from a private
source to a public sink will be detected.
What makes FlowDroid special is its highly accurate modeling of An-
droid’s life cycles. This is important as an app can be started in many dier-
ent ways. In addition to life cycles, FlowDroid is also able to track callback
functions, enabling it to track leaks via button clicks and other UI events. Im-
portant for the car API used in this paper is that FlowDroid can track dynam-
ically registered callback functions, which is used to establish the connection
to the car.
In order to make FlowDroid fully functional with Android Automotive
apps, we extended the tool with new sources and sinks. Some of the sources
added were used to acquire the car’s manufacturer, model and year. For sinks,
we added functions for writing to the climate control APIs.
Observable ows Taint tracking is not always enough to nd all privacy
leaks. For this reason, a more powerful tool that can detect observable im-
plicit ows is introduced. TheWeare Family paper by Balliu et al. [4] presents
a two-fold hybrid analysis solution. The rst stage is a static analysis that
transforms the application and adds monitors. These monitors will aid the
dynamic analysis tool in the second stage to nd implicit ows. The added
monitors are in this case used to track the program counter label and analyze
the current taint value, making it possible to detect potential leaks during
runtime on the device. The dynamic tool developed in the paper is an ex-
tension of TaintDroid [10]. By using the transformed program together with
TaintDroid, the new tool is able to detect observable implicit ows, some-
thing TaintDroid was not able to do.
5 SPOTIFY CASE STUDY
To test some of the countermeasures, an in-depth case study was performed
on the Spotify app. The motivation behind using Spotify is that it was the
only third-party app available on the emulator and test bed, making it the
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most realistic app to test. It was also much larger in size than the proof-of-
concept attacks. The larger size will show how well the methods handle real
apps.
5.1 Permissions
The rst analysis that has to be performed is to gather an understanding of
the permissions the app uses. Spotify needs permission to Internet, Blue-
tooth and NFC, for data transfer. Furthermore, it also requires permission to
change audio settings, run at startup, and prevent the device from sleeping.
Since Spotify is a music streaming app that should be able to run in the back-
ground, as well as talk to other Bluetooth devices, these permissions seem
innocuous. Shifting focus to the dangerous permissions, Spotify does require
permission to read the accounts on the device, contacts stored on the device,
the device ID, and information about current calls. It is not clearly motivated
why this information is necessary, and while some connection between the
Spotify user and the device user is reasonable, having access to all contacts
seems excessive. Spotify does not ask for the location permission, instead,
they use IP-addresses for location [47]. In addition, Spotify can also record
audio and take pictures, as well as read and write access to the external stor-
age. Taking pictures is necessary to scan QR-codes and the microphone will
be used in Spotify’s driving mode [46]. Access to external storage is rea-
sonable since it allows for oine storage of music, however, it does include
access to other photos and media les beyond Spotify’s.
5.2 Vulnerability detection
To ensure that the app does not have any known vulnerabilities QARK is
used to scan the app. While QARK didn’t nd any severe vulnerabilities, it
did nd cases where a vulnerability could arise, e.g. by using a WebView in an
older version of Android (API ≤ 18). Moreover, it also points out interesting
entry-points into the app, one of them leading to a version of Spotify meant
for another automotive system. In addition, a malicious third-party app can
also send intents to Spotify to search and play arbitrary music, skip songs,
or even crash the app. QARK did not nd any vulnerabilities relating to the
vehicle APIs, motivating the need for further analysis.
5.3 AutoTame
Using AutoTame, multiple warnings about both changing the volume and
querying for max volume was found. Further manual analysis proved that
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the maximum volume was used directly to set the volume, as shown in Fig-
ure 1.2.
1 int i = this.c.getStreamMaxVolume(0);
2 this.c.setStreamVolume(0, i, 0);
3
Figure 1.2: Decompiled code setting volume to max
5.4 Information flow analysis
The permissions give an upper bound on what the app is capable of do-
ing. A more precise understanding of the app is achieved by analyzing it
with FlowDroid, using implicit ow tracking. Using these settings the in-
formation ow analysis found 13 leaks in the app. One interesting leak was
getLastKnownLocation being leaked into a dynamic receiver registration.
As shown in Figure 1.3, FlowDroid was able to track the sensitive location
through dierent assignments, function calls and control ows. While this
case might be quite benign, as it only leaks one bit, it still shows the capabil-
ities of the technique.
The analysis also over-approximates some leaks, especially when the in-
formation being sent is based on information being received. A concrete
example of this is when threads try to communication using sendMessage
and obtainMessage. Since the obtained information could contain sensitive
information, it is agged as a leak. This could potentially be solved using









Figure 1.3: The publicly observable addAction function is implicitly depen-
dent on the private location information.
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5.5 Summary
To summarize these ndings, we see that a more robust and at the same
time more ne-grained permission model would be benecial, as it would al-
low apps like Spotify to use lower precision location data instead of privacy-
invading high precision data. In addition, vulnerability detection methods
succeed in nding a bug that could be exploited to terminate Spotify. Finally,
static analysis proved successful for automatically detecting privacy leaks.
6 RELATED WORK
Previous security and privacy research on vehicles have to a large extent fo-
cused on low-level problems relating to the internal components. Koscher et
al. [24] showed that with physical access to the CAN bus it is possible to con-
trol both the speedometer, horn and in-vehicle displays to distract the driver.
Miller and Valasek [33] gained similar access to the CAN bus, this time re-
motely. A similar vulnerability found in an infotainment system used in cars
from Volkswagen was also recently discovered by researchers in the Nether-
lands [7]. They showed that it was possible to connect to the car via WiFi
to exploit a service running in the infotainment system to gain remote code
execution system. The most recent study on attacks against vehicles were
done by researchers at Tencent Keen Security Lab [48], where they found
multiple vulnerabilities in the infotainment system and Telematics Control
Unit of BMW cars, resulting in control of the CAN buses.
A contribution of our paper is to show that even without access to the
internal buses or exploiting low-level vulnerabilities, it is possible to cause
distractions and leak private information.
A more high-level study was done by Mazloom et al. [30] where they
conducted a security analysis of the MirrorLink protocol. MirrorLink allows
smartphones to run apps on the cars infotainment system. Their analysis
showed weaknesses in the MirrorLink protocol which could, amongst other
things, allow malicious smartphone apps to play unwanted music or interfere
with navigation. Mandal et al. [28] showed that the similar system Android
Auto have multiple problems that can be abused by third-party apps. For
example, auto playing audio when launching an app or showing visual ad-
vertisements, both which are against Android Auto’s quality policy. In our
paper, we show similar attacks are possible on Android Automotive, how-
ever, without the requirement of the user’s smartphone, since the malicious
app runs on the infotainment system.
Intents, which is the main component in our exltration attack, are prob-
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lematic for many reasons. Khadiranaikar et al. [23] highlighted some of these
problems, including how malicious apps can both steal information and com-
promise other apps using intents. Our paper builds on these ideas to develop
new exltration methods for the Android Automotive platform.
There is a large body of work on Android permissions [14, 38, 39]. As
a representative example, a study on Android permissions by Porter Felt et
al. [37] shows that many apps are using more permissions that they need,
i.e. not adhering to the principle of least privilege. Other researches [6],
also argue for the need of a more ne-grained model which can grant ac-
cess to specic functions instead of full APIs or services. Extensions such as
Apex [36] have also been developed in order to supply end users with a more
ne-grained model, capable of granting permissions based on user-specied
policies. While our focus is on the specics of the in-vehicle setting, we ar-
gue that many apps get access to more data than necessary due to the coarse
granularity of the permission model itself. For example, a weather app or
Spotify app only needs low-precision location, such as city level.
7 CONCLUSIONS
To the best of our knowledge, we have presented the rst study to analyze
application-level security on the Android Automotive infotainment system.
Unfortunately, our analysis shows that in-vehicle Android apps are currently
as secure as regular phone apps. We argue it is insucient because in-vehicle
apps can aect road safety and to some extent user privacy.
Our study of the attack surface available to third-party apps include driver
disturbance, availability, and privacy attacks, for which there is currently no
protection mechanisms in Android Automotive.
Consequently, it is important for car manufacturers that third-party apps
are limited in their abilities to cause a considerable distraction for the driver.
Additionally, there are a number of vehicle specic APIs, such as access to
current gear and engine RPM, that is a cause for concern when it comes to
user privacy.
To address the vulnerabilities that lead to these attacks, we have sug-
gested the countermeasures of robust and ne-grained permissions, API con-
trol, system support, and program analysis.
We have designed and developed AutoTame, a tool for detecting danger-
ous vehicle-specic API usage. We have demonstrated that in-vehicle code
analysis can be performed using AndroBugs and QARK, to detect known
vulnerabilities, AutoTame to detect vehicle specic vulnerabilities and Flow-
Droid, with the additional vehicle specic sources and sinks, to detect privacy
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leaking apps.
We have evaluated the countermeasures with a Spotify app using an in-
frastructure of Volvo Cars.
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Table 1.3: List of attacks and their severity score, based on CVSS v3.
Name CVSS v3 Vector Score
SoundBlast AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L 4.4
Fork bomb AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H 5.9
Intent storm AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H 5.9
Permissionless speed AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N 3.3
Permissionless exltration AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N 3.3
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Abstract. Undesired navigation in browsers powers a signicantclass of attacks on web applications. In a move to mitigate risks
associated with undesired navigation, the security community has pro-
posed a standard that gives control to web pages to restrict naviga-
tion. The standard draft introduces a new navigate-to directive of
the Content Security Policy (CSP). The directive is currently being im-
plemented by mainstream browsers. This paper is a rst evaluation of
navigate-to, focusing on security, performance, and automatization
of navigation policies. We present new vulnerabilities introduced by
the directive into the web ecosystem, opening up for attacks such as
probing to detect if users are logged in to other websites or have active
shopping carts, bypassing third-party cookie blocking, exltrating se-
crets, as well as leaking browsing history. Unfortunately, the directive
triggers vulnerabilities even in websites that do not use the directive
in their policies. We identify both specication- and implementation-
level vulnerabilities and propose countermeasures to mitigate both. To
aid developers in conguring navigation policies, we develop and im-
plement AutoNav1, an automated black-box mechanism to infer navi-
gation policies. AutoNav leverages the benets of origin-wide policies
in order to improve security without degrading performance. We eval-
uate the viability of navigate-to and AutoNav by an empirical study
on Alexa’s top 10,000 websites.

1 Introduction
As the power of the web platform grows, attackers increasingly target client-
side vulnerabilities [3, 9, 12, 16, 18, 37, 39, 43, 50, 56, 57]. Exploiting these
vulnerabilities is eective because clients manipulate highly sensitive infor-
mation, like login credentials, banking, health, and location data, on behalf
of the user.
1.1 Motivation
One of the bigger classes of client-side security vulnerabilities on today’s
web is cross-site scripting (XSS) [45]. An XSS vulnerability gives an attacker
the power to execute JavaScript code on another website. This can be used
to steal user credentials, change the behavior of the application or render
the website unusable. A common approach to mitigate this problem is to let
servers send extra security policies along with each HTTP response. The web
browser will then enforce these policies, for example, by restricting which
scripts to allow on the webpage. These security policies have been dened
by the web security community as part of Content Security Policy (CSP) [63].
Navigation attacks The current CSP standard (level 2 [63]) does not ad-
dress attacks via navigation. Attackers can thus freely redirect users to mali-
cious or inappropriate websites. This type of attack can aect the conden-
tiality, integrity and availability of the attacked website. For condentiality,
an attacker with injection capabilities can inject the following script to leak
the secret cookie.
1 <script>
2 window.location = "http://evil.com/?c="+document.cookie;
3 </script>
4
When the script is executed the user will be sent to http://evil.com, along
with their cookies, potentially allowing the attacker to take over their ac-
count. In addition to only stealing the cookie, the attacker could launch a
phishing attack by designing http://evil.com to look like the attacked
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website. Here the user could be asked to supply more condential informa-
tion or be forced to download malicious software. The availability of the
website is also compromised as every user visiting the page containing the
injected script will be sent away. Note that while CSP can block scripts, an
attacker could also force the user to perform a navigation by using meta tags
as shown below. While not valid HTML, modern browsers will follow meta




The navigate-to directive To mitigate these problems the World Wide
Web Consortium (W3C) has drafted a standard for the new CSP directive
navigate-to [61]. This directive has already been implemented in Chrome [36]
and Firefox [28]. A common motivation for the directive is to increase the se-
curity on websites, as well as, give advertising platforms better control over
navigations in ads [40]. We illustrate this in two example scenarios: HTM-
L/JavaScript injection and malicious advertisement.
HTML/JavaScript injection Understanding the space of navigation links
on a website can improve security thanks to navigate-to. By limiting the
possible navigations, attackers will not be able to redirect users. A real-world
example of where this policy would have helped is a vulnerability on bloc
kchain.info [27]. Attackers were able to inject HTML and JavaScript into
the search function on the page. This meant that a URL similar to blockcha
in.info/?search=<code>, which appears to point to blockchain.info,
could redirect the user to another website. This is known as a reective XSS
vulnerability [48], as the code in the URL is reected onto the page. Although
blockchain.info used CSP to mitigate XSS, it was still possible to inject
HTML code that forces a redirect. With the new directive, the following CSP
policy can mitigate this type of attack. This policy blocks any navigation
attempt to anything but self, i.e. blockchain.info.
1 navigate-to ’self’
2
Malicious advertisement Advertisement platform providers benet from
ensuring that users who click on their ads end up on the correct page. This
is especially important if the pages where the ads are served are sensitive
to inappropriate material, e.g. websites for kids, governments, or highly re-
spected nancial websites. Using the new directive, advertisers would be
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able to block navigations leading to incorrect ads. The policy is required
because even if the target site for the ad is correct when the ad is bought,
the website can at a later stage be hacked or miscongured. Google Ads
could, for example, serve the following policy with an ad from shoes.com.
This would only allow navigation to https://shoes.com, blocking both the
HTTP version, as well as, possible deep-links to apps like app://shoes.com.
The unsafe-allow-redirects keyword allows for any number of server-
side redirections before reaching shoes.com.
1 navigate-to https://shoes.com ’unsafe-allow-redirects’
2
1.2 Research questions
The standardization [35, 61] and implementation [28, 36] eorts for
navigate-to are well underway. The time is critical to ask questions on
the security, performance, and adoptability of the proposed directive, before
its adoption starts on the web. (Our analysis at the time of the writing con-
rms that the landing pages of Alexa’s top 10,000 domains are yet to con-
tain navigate-to CSP headers). By pursuing these questions, our goal is to
deepen understanding of navigation policies and their impact, contribute to
the emergence of the new standard, and to utilize our ndings for settling
the ongoing discussions by the community [29].
Security While there seems to be much to gain from a navigation pol-
icy, what is the impact on the security of the entire web ecosystem? For a
fully-edged security evaluation, we seek to uncover both new vulnerabil-
ities and amplifying eects of known vulnerabilities. Our methodology is
thus to investigate possibilities of exploiting the directive by a comprehen-
sive range of attackers dened in the security literature [39]: injection [5],
gadget [6], web [2] and passive network [25] attackers. Even though these at-
tackers share some capabilities, they each have unique abilities, e.g. reading
network trac or hosting websites, and as such require individual analysis.
This brings us to the questions of security: Does the new policy “break the
web”? Does the new policy introduce security vulnerabilities? How can they be
mitigated and by whom?
Automatization Once the new directive is secured, how can we aid its
adoption? CSP has been notoriously hard to adopt, introducing insecure poli-
cies or broken websites [56, 57]. To help developers use the new directive,
and increase both usability and adoptability, we investigate the possibility
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of automatically generating navigation policies. Hence, the question: Can
automatic mechanisms be used to help generate the new policy?
Performance In contrast to CSP directives like script-src, intended to
whitelist scripts that can be loaded by a webpage, the navigate-to directive
will whitelist possible navigations. This results in already lengthy response
headers becoming even larger, further increasing the overhead of security
headers. This brings us to the question of performance: What are ecient
methods for delivering the new policy?
1.3 Contributions
This paper is a rst systematic evaluation of navigate-to. Our goal is to
both initiate research on navigation security and to aect the emerging stan-
dards for navigation policies. We examine the security implications, e-
ciency, and the possibility of automatic generation of the new navigate-to
policy.
Security The intricate connections between policies together with the grow-
ing complexity of the web results in new mechanisms becoming more chal-
lenging to incorporate into the ecosystem. This motivates the need to analyze
multiple types of attackers, as well as, reexamining existing mechanisms in
combination with new ones. We follow a methodology of examining the ef-
fects of navigate-to on a comprehensive range of attackers: injection [5],
gadget [6], web [2] and passive network [25] attackers. By scrutinizing the
full attack surface of the new directive, with respect to dierent types of at-
tackers, we identify specication- and implementation-level vulnerabilities
that can be exploited (Section 3). The vulnerabilities allow attackers to probe
other websites to detect if users are logged in or have active shopping carts,
bypass blocking mechanisms of third-party cookies, leak browsing history,
and open up new methods for exltration. This demonstrates that the di-
rective “breaks the web” in the sense of introducing vulnerabilities even in
otherwise secure websites that do not use the directive in their policies. We
present mitigations to security problems, both for web and policy developers
(Section 4).
Automatization Looking ahead when the proposed mitigations are in place,
our goal is to aid in the adoption of navigate-to. We develop AutoNav, an
automatic mechanism for navigation policy inference (Section 5). AutoNav
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crawls websites and generates navigate-to policies. The goal of this mech-
anism is to simplify the deployment of the new directive by helping web
developers and security engineers to nd tting policies for their websites.
To further improve security, AutoNav can also generate origin-wide poli-
cies for the new origin policy delivery mechanism that is currently being
drafted [59]. This improves security by applying the policy to the entire ori-
gin, covering pages that are easy to forget, like error pages. We implement
and evaluate the mechanism by an empirical study (Section 6). In our experi-
ments, we craw 100 pages per domain for 10,000 domains. Based on a subset
of 80 pages, AutoNav generates a policy for the remaining 20 pages. For 42%
of websites, AutoNav generated a policy which fully covered the 20 pages,
and at 59% 19 out the 20 pages were covered. Further investigation into the
category of websites shows that shopping websites and adult websites are
the easiest to cover.
Performance To evaluate the performance impact of the policy we per-
form an empirical study (Section 6). Based on 10,000 crawled domains from
Alexa’s top 10,000, the policy will result in an overhead of 215 bytes for
each HTTP response. We create simplication strategies to nd a balance
between security, performance and maintainability. These simplications
convert complicated policies with multiple subdomains to more manageable
policies by using wildcards. For example, instead of including all language-
specic subdomains from Wikipedia navigate-to *.wikipedia.comwould
be enough. Our simplication algorithm decreased the overhead by between
40% and 47%. Furthermore, we show that the use of an origin policy would
result in an overhead of 1904 bytes in total, as opposed to per HTTP response.
This is further decreased to 1004 bytes by using our simplication algorithm.
A 900 byte reduction might not seem like much, but it can have a big impact
on larger websites [21].
2 Background
Setting the background, we present the threat model in terms of relevant
attackers. We describe CSP and how it relates to the origin policy. Finally,
we explain navigation methods and how they are treated in the navigate-to
directive.
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2.1 Threat model
The main goal of the navigate-to directive is to give web developers control
over where users can navigate from their website. The assets that need pro-
tecting include condentiality, integrity and availability. Previous research
has already shown how condential information, such as cookies, can be ex-
ltrated using navigation [65]. While the new directive is a step in the right
direction to address data exltration, Zalewski [65] points out that control
over navigation is not necessarily enough. Attackers could, for example, in-
ject HTML or JavaScript that change documents from private to public on
a website like Dropbox. Forced navigation can also be used for phishing at-
tacks by redirecting users to a similar-looking, but attacker-controlled, web-
site.
Modern web browsers support many dierent methods for navigation,
e.g. by clicking on a link, submitting a form, etc. These navigation methods,
and the subset that the navigate-to directive is intended to apply to, are
explained in Sections 2.4 and 2.5.
As mentioned above, we are interested in a comprehensive security eval-
uation of the impact of the directive on the entire web ecosystem. Hence,
our threat model includes four types of attackers from the security litera-
ture [39]: injection, gadget, web and network attackers. In practice there is
some overlap between the classes, for example, an attacker with web attacker
capabilities will usually also have injection attacker capabilities. However, the
best mitigation strategy might be dierent depending on which specic class
we need to defend against. Therefore it is important to study each distinct
class of attacker.
Injection attacker The injection attacker [5] is able to inject content into
a website. A typical example is a user who can post content on a forum. If
the user’s post contains JavaScript then that code could be executed by other
users on the site, in this scenario, with the goal to force a navigation.
Gadget attacker The gadget attacker [6] is similar but more powerful as
they are allowed to host code, or gadgets, on other websites. A notable ex-
ample is JQuery which is a JavaScript snippet that is used by many websites.
Since JavaScript do not support any isolation, these gadgets run with the
same capabilities as other scripts on the website. A malicious gadget could
exltrate information from the website it is integrated to, modify content on
pages or even navigate the user away from the website.
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Web attacker The web attacker [2] is able to host and congure a full web-
site. This is especially important for advertisers who want to ensure that the
landing page does not redirect to anything other than what was specied in
the ad.
Passive network attacker A passive network attacker [25] can listen in
on all the trac sent from and to a client but can not decrypt HTTPS. If the
trac is not encrypted, the attacker can read passwords and session cookies
being sent to the server.
Note that navigate-to is not designed to handle network attacks. Yet
we pay attention to network attackers in our eort to analyze the impact of
the directive on the entire web ecosystem.
2.2 CSP
CSP is intended to mitigate cross-site scripting (XSS) and other code injection
attacks. The current version of CSP, level 2, is supported by all major web
browsers [26]. Level 3, which includes the new navigate-to directive, is
being discussed and drafted [61].
CSP protects the users by specifying which resources and scripts are al-
lowed on a page. The web server sends the CSP policies each time a user
requests a page. These policies are then enforced by the browser to, among
other things, block XSS. The policy below will only allow scripts to be loaded
from the current origin, still blocking any injected inline scripts. In addi-
tion, the reporting header Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only [33]
can be used to report policy violations without enforcing them. These re-
ports are sent as POST requests to the server. They can also be detected
using SecurityPolicyViolationEvent in JavaScript.
1 Content-Security-Policy: script-src ’self’
2
2.3 Origin policy
Today, CSP headers are sent with every HTTP(S) response, which is a con-
cern for both safety and performance [50]. For security, it is easy to for-
get the policy on special pages, like error pages [59]. It also harms perfor-
mance because servers need to repeat the same policy for each response,
even if the policy should apply to all. To address this, specications are be-
ing drafted [59], implemented [60], and evaluated [50] to enable origin-wide
policies, known as origin policies [59] or origin manifests [50]. Using an origin
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policy, the server only needs to include once which policies should apply to
the whole origin.
2.4 Navigation
Navigations can be performed in many dierent ways by browsers, e.g. by
clicking on a link, submitting a form or running JavaScript. Navigation meth-
ods can be split into two dierent categories, user-initiated or document-
initiated. While navigation is dened in the Fetch [52] and HTML [4] stan-
dards, the exact methods available depend on the web browser implementa-
tion. We make an eort to summarize the most common methods in Table 2.4.
The Automatic column shows if the navigation method can be performed au-
tomatically. This is true for all JavaScript function and, in case JavaScript is
allowed, <a> and <form> tags. It is worth noting that while a web page
cannot read a user’s browsing history, it can initiate navigation to go back
or forward in the browser history. There are many .location functions in
JavaScript that can navigate, e.g. window, document, parent, etc. They all
use the Location object dened in the HTML standard [4]. Some functions,
like window.navigate, only works in Internet Explorer [11]. The last col-
umn species which methods navgiate-to aects.
Table 2.4: Navigation methods together with initiator and possibility to au-
tomatically navigate.
Method Initiator Automatic Aected
<a> tag Document With JavaScript X
<form> tag Document With JavaScript X
<meta> tag Document Yes X
<iframe> tag [51] Document Yes X
window.open [53] Document Yes X
*.location [4] Document Yes X
window.navigate [11] Document Yes X
Typing the URL User No
History buttons User & Document Yes
Home button User No
2.5 Navigate-to directive
The navigate-to directive gives developers the power to control the naviga-
tions a document can initiate. Document initiated navigations are discussed
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in Section 2.4. This directive makes it harder for attackers to inject code to
redirect users from legitimate websites. For example, if an attacker manages
to inject links on disney.com then Disney’s reputation is at stake if links lead
to inappropriate websites. To tackle this, Disney could add the following to
their CSP policy:
1 navigate-to *.disney.com *.thewaltdisneycompany.com
2
This would instruct the browser to only accept navigations to subdomains of
disney.com and thewaltdisneycompany.com, and block all navigations to
other websites. The standard also introduces the new keyword
unsafe-allow-redirects, which allows any redirects as long as the nal
destination is allowed by the policy. It is deemed less safe since it does not
have full control over all the sites in the redirect chain. However, it is still
better than nothing in terms of limiting navigations.
The navigate-to directive is currently being standardized by W3C [61]
and implemented in Chrome [36] and Firefox [28]. It is available in the
current version of Chrome (version 77.0.3865), and other Chromium-based
browsers like Edge and Brave, behind a ag that enables experimental fea-
tures. It is also available in Firefox Nightly (Version 71.0a1) behind a ag [28].
3 Vulnerabilities
This section presents vulnerabilities and security concerns related to the
navigate-to policy. These vulnerabilities are not navigation attacks, but
rather vulnerabilities that become possible due to navigate-to. Except for
the last vulnerability in Section 3.3.3, where we rather want to show that
a small improvement to navigate-to can solve an existing problem. The
policy introduces new methods for acquiring privacy-sensitive information,
circumvention of security mechanism and data exltration. All the attacks
described in this section have been tested in practice. While some of the
vulnerabilities, like the data exltration, relies on the existence of other vul-
nerabilities, like content injection, the navigate-to adds a new layer to the
attacks. This possibility of combining attacks shows the importance of reex-
amining existing ones when introducing new mechanisms.
3.1 Methodology
To systematically nd vulnerabilities we distinguish vulnerabilities relating
to the specication of the navigate-to directive and vulnerabilities related
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to its implementation. For each category, we divide the investigation of vul-
nerabilities pertaining to condentiality, integrity and availability, in accor-
dance with the CIA triad. We draw on our threat model and examine vulner-
abilities with respect to injection, web, gadget, and passive network attack-
ers. Finally, we analyze how the directive can be used to circumvent modern
countermeasures, such as third-party cookie blocking.
The presentation of the vulnerabilities is ordered by our estimate of their
impact, from high to low. Table 2.5 lists the vulnerabilities we discover to-
gether with their corresponding attacker model. Interesting to note is that
resource probing and Google Search proling can be exploited to attack web-
sites that themselves do not use the navigate-to directive. This results in
previously security websites becoming insecure.
Table 2.5: The uncovered vulnerabilities together with corresponding at-
tacker model.
Vulnerability / Attacker Injection Web Gadget Passive network
Resource probing X
Google Search proling X
Third-party cookie bypass X
History sning X
Data exltration X X
Ads leaking data X
3.2 Specification
The following vulnerabilities are present in the specication. This means
that any browser following the specication correctly will be vulnerable.
evil.com a.io/secret/ a.io/login/
Unauthenticated
Figure 2.4: A user visiting evil.com will be navigated to a.io/secret/. If
they are not logged in, they are further redirected to a.io/log
in/.
3.2.1 Resource probing
In cases where web applications redirect based on sensitive resources, these
resources could be probed. For example, probing for the existence of Dropbox
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les. The probing attacks in this section are deterministic, as opposed to
other attacks that rely on timings [55]. The attacks are also general and
could potentially be used on any website, not solely on advertiser platforms
such as the attack presented by Venkatadri et al. [54].
A malicious website, i.e. a web attacker, can navigate a user to
dropbox.com/preview/wallet.txt to detect if a user has a le named
wallet.txt. If no such le exists then the user is redirected to
dropbox.com/home/wallet.txt, making it possible to craft a policy which
blocks /preview/ but not the redirection to /home/, like the following. Note
here that we only use path-sensitivity to block /preview/. If we are redi-
rected, then path-sensitivity is no longer available and we only have to allow
dropbox.com. The main dierence compared to previous work on CSP redi-
rections [23] is that we only need path-sensitivity for the rst request, not
the redirects.
1 navigate-to ’unsafe-allow-redirects’ https://www.dropbox.com/
not_preview/;
2
By utilising invisible iframes multiple les can be checked in parallel, without
the user being navigated away from the malicious website.
One specic application of resource probing that has been researched be-
fore is login detection. Previous methods [20, 32] relies on third-party cook-
ies, which can be blocked by the user or by the proposed default SameSite
policy [62]. Instead, note that a navigation to facebook.com/settings/
will redirect the user to the login page, facebook.com/login.php, if they
are not authenticated, similar to Figure 2.4. By allowing only one of these
URLs in the policy, the attacker can dierentiate between a successful nav-
igation and a blocked one. This feature makes our method more powerful
and general.
We have also found that on some E-commerce websites it is possible to
detect if a customer has anything in their shopping cart. This is because
navigating directly to the shopping cart or checkout page sometimes redi-
rects the user depending on the content of the cart. PrestaShop, which is an
E-commerce platform used on hundreds of thousands of websites [8], does
exactly this. By visiting example.com/en/order a user will be redirected to
example.com/en/cart, assuming example.com uses PrestaShop.
Some of the probing attacks can leak more data if they are done in an ac-
tive fashion. The PrestaShop attack can be improved to, in theory, enumerate
the full cart. This is due to a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) [47] vulner-
ability in PrestaShop, currently being disclosed, which allows an attacker to
add and remove items. Using this method an attacker can repeatedly remove
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items and then check if the cart is empty.
These are only a few examples we have found where redirects are based
on sensitive data. We believe that many more such redirects currently ex-
ists on the web. Furthermore, navigations can bypass lax SameSite cookies,
making the attack possible on sites where previous CSRF attacks were not
possible.
3.2.2 Google Search proling
Google Search relies on personalized search [19], meaning that the results of
a search query are based on the users’ previous interactions with Google. A
recent study [24] shows that users are put into so-called “lter bubbles” by
Google, resulting in varying result when searching for political terms such
as “gun control” or “immigration”. A web attacker can craft a malicious web-
site which uses the navigate-to directive together with Google’s I’m feeling
lucky function to extract top results from visitors. This type of extraction at-
tack is called cross-site search and has previously been successfully mounted
against Gmail and other websites [17]. The main dierence is that previous
methods have relied on timing, whereas our method is fully deterministic.
Castelluccia et al. [10] were also able to infer sensitive information about
users based on Google Searches. However, their approach required network
attacker capabilities and assumed the trac was unencrypted, which is not
the case anymore. Our attack can be mounted by anyone with the capability
to set up a website.
The attacker can then use these top results from Google to infer these
lter bubbles. Using the URL https://www.google.com/search?q=QUER
Y&btnI, Google will automatically redirect the user the top result for term
“QUERY”. Therefore the I’m feeling lucky function acts as an open redirec-
tor, which is something both OWASP [46] and Google [34] themselves warn
about. It is well known that Google has this problem but so far they choose
to accept the risk [1]. However, the navigate-to directive adds a new di-
mension to the problem as it enables attackers to infer data about users.
To exploit this the attacker can specify a report-only policy that only al-
lows google.com, as shown below. The redirect will violate the policy and
the browser will dutifully report which domain was in violation to the ma-
licious website. The attacker can iteratively update the query to get more
results. Assuming searching for “news” would return news.com, then the
next query would be “news -site:news.com”, which excludes news.com and
perhaps returns reports.com instead. Another attack vector would be other
search engines using this approach to directly copy personalized search re-
sults from Google, similar to what Bing did [41].
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1 Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: navigate-to ’unsafe-allow-
redirects’ google.com
2
3.2.3 Third-party cookie bypass
A cookie is a piece of data that websites can save locally on users’ ma-
chines. [31] Depending on how the cookie is acquired, it will either be con-
sidered a rst-party cookie or a third-party cookie. A navigation will result
in rst-party cookies while image request and similar results in third-party
cookies.
Third-party cookies are useful for advertisers [14] as it allows them to use
small tracking pixels [15] for tracking users. Modern browsers allow users
to block third-party cookies or do it by default [42].
Previous work has demonstrated how Cookie Synchronization [7, 38] can
be used by ad platforms to eectively break the same-origin policy. Privacy-
aware users can mitigate this by blocking third-party cookies altogether.
However, the navigate-to directive introduces a new method for adver-
tisers to circumvent this by using navigations. As it requires control over
the CSP headers, web attackers are the main threat. Figure 2.5 shows a user
visiting a.io, then being forcibly navigated to track.com and acquiring a
rst-party cookie. Using the following policy, the redirection will be blocked,





Figure 2.5: When a user visits a.io or b.io, they can force the user to ob-
tain rst-party cookies from track.com.
3.3 Implementation
The following vulnerabilities are due to implementation decisions. We focus
on Chrome’s [36] and Firefox’s [28] implementations of navigate-to,
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3.3.1 History sning
The navigate-to policy can, in some cases, be exploited by a web attacker
with a malicious website to probe which websites a user has visited. The
attack uses the fact that websites using HSTS force the browser to remember
and upgrade insecure connections. Previous methods exploiting this have
relied on timing attacks which are now mitigated [64].
Using navigate-to, a malicious website can make a POST request to
another site which uses HSTS but is not preloaded. If the site redirects based
on the POST data then the attacker might be able to detect if a user has visited
the site before. This is possible because if the user has visited the site before
it will result in an internal redirect (HTTP 307), which keeps the POST data.
Otherwise, the server will redirect (HTTP 301/302), which drops the POST
data. If the server specically performs a 307 redirect then the attack will
not work. By crafting a CSP that does not allow the redirect, the attacker can
dierentiate between the two cases, denoted X and Y in Figure 2.6. This is,









Figure 2.6: If target.com uses HSTS, and the user has visited the site be-
fore, then the browser will automatically upgrade the connec-
tion to HTTPS using a 307 redirect instead of a server side 301.
3.3.2 Data exltration and communication
Previous research has shown that data exltration is possible in the face of
CSP [49]. The usage of forms and links to exltrate data has also been stud-
ied [65]. However, the navigate-to policy introduces an improved method
for exltration, and two-way communication, based on JavaScript together
with navigation. This works in Chrome, but not Firefox, as Chrome does not
unload the page for navigate-to violations.
Consider a website using connect-src ’none’ and frame-src ’none’
to limit external loads as much as possible. The connect-src directive pro-
tects against some exltration methods including XHR, fetch and <a ping>,
while frame-src will block exltration to iframes. Assume the website uses
unsafe-allow-redirects followed by a list of allowed URLs. Note here
that we show that unsafe has implications beyond the scope of restricting
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navigation. An attacker capable of injecting JavaScript, i.e. either an injec-
tion or gadget attacker, can now use window.location, as shown in the list-
ing below, to exltrate arbitrary data. Each navigation request will exltrate
data, then be blocked by the policy, as the attacker can choose a website out-
side the CSP whitelist. Furthermore, by adding a SecurityPolicyViolation
event listener the attacker can inspect the blocked URI in the violation. To
send a response, evil.com would redirect the request to a subdomain like
<msg>.evil.com.
1 function exfiltrate (data) {
2 window.location = "http://evil.com/?d=" + data;
3 }
4
The main dierence between not using navigate-to and using the policy
described is that by blocking the navigations, the control is returned to the
attacker, allowing for further stealth exltration and communication.
3.3.3 Ads leaking data
We have found that ads served over HTTPS can still leak the nal landing
page to a passive network attacker if an ad in the redirection chain is un-
encrypted. While network-level eavesdropping is outside of CSP’s threat
model, the navigate-to directive presents a great opportunity to x this
problem. The problem stems from the fact that when a user clicks on an ad
they can be channeled through multiple tracking websites. Listing 2.1 shows
a chain where the user is redirected to three dierent websites before the
landing page. We performed a small empirical study using the same dataset
as in Section 6. We extracted all iframes and compared their source URL to a
list of known advertisement platforms, e.g. DoubleClick. If the URL matched
we followed it and recorded the redirects. This resulted in 24650 unique ads,
of which 26.7% have a website between the advertisement platform and the
landing page. This highlights the need for advertisement platforms to con-
sider potential redirects from tracking websites and further motivates the







Listing 2.1: Example of
an ad chain containing three dierent unencrypted domains
between the encrypted ad platform and landing page.
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As can be seen in Listing 2.1, both the rst and last websites use HTTPS
but there exist sites between that are unencrypted. This is very hard for a
user to detect as both the ad and the landing page seems secure. The prob-
lem with having HTTP in the chain is that an eavesdropper can follow the
request and nd the landing page. Our empirical experiments show 10.6% of
the ads follow this pattern. As ads become more personal this becomes a pri-
vacy concern. Advertisements related to economic status or specic diseases
might be leaked without the user’s knowledge.
4 Countermeasures
This section presents countermeasures to the vulnerabilities in 3. The coun-
termeasures cover the specication, mitigations for web developers, as well
as, implementation improvements in web browsers. Similarly to the vulner-




Previous login detection methods have forced web developers to rewrite their
applications to avoid special types of redirections. As mentioned in [13],
Google added an extra regex check to make sure the redirection did not lead
to resources that could be loaded cross-origin, e.g. “jpg”, “js” and “ico”.
The navigate-to policy circumvents this by being able to block and re-
port dierent paths in the URL, i.e. it is possible to block
example.com/settings/ and allow example.com/login/. In this case, if
/settings/ redirects to /login/ for unauthenticated users, then the CSP
report log can be inspected to discern between authenticated and unauthen-
ticated users.
To x this, path precision could be removed from the policy. If an origin
as a whole can not be trusted, it seems to add little security to trust certain
paths on the origin. Since these vulnerabilities aect websites that do not
use navigate-to, we also present countermeasures web developers can im-
plement. We recommend avoiding redirection based on secrets. Instead, by
showing an error page or rendering the login form on the same page the
website is guaranteed to not leak any data, as there will be no redirections.
If redirection is necessary, encoding paths in GET parameters, e.g. from




4.1.2 Google Search proling
For vulnerabilities like Google Search proling, as presented in Section 3.2.2,
the key countermeasure is to avoid open redirects [46]. One possible way for
Google to accomplish this without removing the I’m feeling lucky function
is to use a CSRF token [47].
4.1.3 Third-party cookie bypass
The navigation path through the redirection chain can depend on the user’s
cookies. For this reason, it is not possible to block cookies while checking if
the navigation is allowed. Instead, we suggest that cookies attained during




Privacy problems related to HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) [22] has
been researched before [44]. However, they focused on tracking mechanisms
similar to cookies but harder to remove.
The solution is to ensure that an attacker can not dierentiate between
the paths in Figure 2.6. Again, it becomes the web developers responsibility
to either use an internal redirect or not redirect on post data.
4.2.2 Data exltration
What makes this attack extra powerful is its ability to regain execution con-
trol after the navigation fails. It is not specied what should happen when the
navigate-to policy blocks a navigation attempt. Currently, Chrome seems
to simulate a 204 response [58], resulting in the continuation of the script,
and the possibility to exltrate more data. Firefox, on the other hand, uses
a full-page error that unloads the original document. By using this strategy
the script will stop executing, blocking further exltration. The attack can
also be mitigated by avoiding unsafe-allow-redirects, as this will block
the exltration during the pre-navigation check.
4.2.3 Ads leaking data
The navigate-to directive could block redirect chains which contain HTTP
websites. Currently, the policy navigate-to https: allows navigation to
any website using HTTPS. However, combined with
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unsafe-allow-redirects HTTP is allowed in the chain, as long as the
landing page is HTTPS. One solution is to add a value
unsafe-allow-https-redirects which would only allow redirection by
HTTPS. A more general solution is to split the policy into navigate-to and
navigate-by, where the latter would apply as long as the request is redi-
rected. When no redirect is received, the landing page is checked against
the navigate-to policy. By using this method, the following policy would





We present AutoNav, an automatic mechanism to aid web developers in in-
ferring policies for their websites. The mechanism crawls the website and
creates a map of where pages can navigate. This mapping is used to gen-
erate and simplify the policies. AutoNav can generate both per-page poli-
cies, where each page on a website gets its own policy, and origin-wide poli-
cies [59].
5.1 Inference
We use a key-value map from the crawler to infer the policies. The page is
used as a key, and a list of all possible navigations from the page is used as a
value. Listing 2.2 shows an example.
1 {
2 "example.com/a.html": [facebook.com, google.com],
3 "example.com/b.html": [twitter.com, google.com]
4 }
5
Listing 2.2: Example of a key-value map generate from crawling two
pages on example.com
Using the key-value map, AutoNav can generate separate policies for
each page on the website. This is shown in Listing 2.3. AutoNav can also
generate an origin-wide policy based on the union of all the URLs, as shown
in Listing 2.4. These policies are then simplied, using the method described
in Section 5.2, to reduce the size and improve maintainability.
1 {
2 "a.html": "navigate-to facebook.com google.com",
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3 "b.html": "navigate-to twitter.com google.com"
4 }
5
Listing 2.3: Per-page policies generated from Listing 2.2.
1 {
2 "*": "navigate-to facebook.com twitter.com google.com"
3 }
4
Listing 2.4: Origin-wide policy generated from Listing 2.2.
5.2 Policy generation
The navigation policy is a whitelist of URLs that the user is allowed to nav-
igate to. In the most secure setting, the policy should contain the full URLs
to each allowed target. While secure, this creates big and hard to main-
tain lists of URLs requiring much bandwidth. Take Wikipedia for exam-
ple, their policy could consist of all subdomains like en.wikipedia.org,
es.wikipedia.org, etc. for each language. A more compact policy is
*.wikipedia.org. This simplication results in both less data being trans-
mitted and a more maintainable policy, however, it does decrease security as
it also allows evil.wikipedia.org.
AutoNav supplies developers with best-eort policies that aim to help
them harden their websites. Using our parameterized simplication algo-
rithm, developers get a slider style method for nding a trade-o between
maintainability, performance and security. The simplication algorithm looks
for evidence that all subdomains are trusted. The two sources used are the
number of URLs that point to the subdomains (denoted t1) and the number
of subdomains that are pointed to (denoted t2). The motivation for t2 is that
even if multiple links are found to a.example.com it does not imply that
b.example.com should be allowed. Similarly, t1 is motivated by the notion
that the more URLs that point to *.example.com, the more it can be trusted.
Figure 2.7 shows the tree representation of 10 URLs pointing to example.com
and its subdomains. ui in the gure represents one URL, e.g. u7 points to a re-
source on test.b.www.example.com. Furthermore, the gure also includes
tuples of the threshold values (t1, t2). Figure 2.8 shows the tree after simpli-
cation using a threshold of (2,2). Using this method the policy will only
contain 3 entries instead of 7 entries.
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Figure 2.7: Tree representation of 10 URLs collected from example.com and
its subdomains. The tuples corresponds to the (t1, t2) thresholds.
Figure 2.9 shows the result from crawling ve pages on ebay.com and
generating a policy. The crawler was only supplied with the start page and
then found the other four using the crawling algorithm from Section 5.3. The
ve pages crawled are shown in the middle of the gure in grey with inte-
ger labels. The arrows from these nodes indicate that a possible navigation
was found between two nodes. The colors correspond to which part of the
policy covers the navigation. As shown, *.ebay.com covers a lot of the sub-
domains, thus they all share the same color. Using the gure, an origin policy
could be generated by taking the union of all the colors.
This method of generating policies guarantees that the functionality of
the website will remain intact. This is because, if a domain is in the list of
possible navigations, then it will be included in the policy. Similar to other
policies, the generated policy would need to be recalculated if the website
was updated to include new possible navigations. For security, the method
guarantees that if a domain is not in the list, then it will not be added to






Figure 2.8: Result of applying the simplication algorithm, using a tresh-
old of (2,2), to the tree in Figure 2.7. Resulting in the fol-




Figure 2.9: Generated policies for ebay.com. The nodes with outwards
pointing arrows are the ve pages that we crawled. All the other
nodes correspond to a possible navigation. The color indicates
which part of the policy covers the navigation.
5.3 Crawling
Our implementation of AutoNav uses selenium with a Chrome instance to
crawl the pages on a website. By only supplying AutoNav with the rst URL
it will automatically collect and crawl new URLs that it nds. When a URL
from the same website is found it is added to a set of unvisited URLs, from
which the next URL is picked. For each page on a domain, all the JavaScript
is executed, then the URLs from links and forms are saved. When the crawl-
ing session is over, the inference method described in Section 5.1 is used to
generate the policy.
5.4 Limitations
We did not take special care to crawl behind the login. However, it is trivial
for a site owner to add a session cookie to the crawler. The more pages
AutoNav can crawl the more the policy will cover. Crawling too few pages
will result in an incomplete yet secure policy. The policy is secure because
AutoNav will never add a domain to the policy that has not been seen.
We use static links to infer the policies, which will miss possible redirec-
tions. While not a security concern, we would produce more precise policies
if each link was followed dynamically and the redirections recorded.
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User-agent sning is a common problem for crawling studies. Since the
AutoNav is designed for developers we think they can manually add entries
like languages.mysite.org and use the AutoNav to detect everything else.
6 Empirical Study
This section presents an empirical study to evaluate the performance impact
of the new directive, as well as, how dierent delivery methods and sim-
plications can reduce the impact. Next, we evaluate AutoNav in how well
automatically generated policies based on a subset of the website cover the
full website.
To test how the new navigate-to policy will function on common web-
sites we utilize AutoNav in a crawling experiment. For calculating the per-
formance impact in Section 6.1, we use Alexa’s top 10,000 websites. For eval-
uating AutoNav itself we use Alexa’s top 14,000, ensuring we have 10,000
domains which all have more than 100 pages each.
6.1 Policy tradeos
This section presents the performance tradeos between per-page and origin-
wide policies together with the delivery methods of HTTP headers and origin
policy.
The costs in Table 2.6 are based on a user visiting n pages on a website,
thus the cost of HTTP headers need aggregation over all pages, i.e.
∑
i≤n.
The cost of sending a single CSP policy depends on the number of URLs it
contains. We dened the cost of the policy based on the set of URLs, i.e. |Ui |,
Ui being the set of URLs on page i. Further, we can dene a set of all URLs as
the union of the sets of URLs on each page as
⋃
j≤nUj , with corresponding
Empirical performance Based on the 10,000 crawled domains, a per-page
policy, without any simplications, would increase the header size with 215
bytes, per response. A more maintainable origin-wide policy results in a size
increase to 1904 bytes. This cost can be decreased by using the origin policy
for delivery, in which case the user only downloads the policy once. Note,
as shown in Table 2.6, that an origin policy outperforms a per-page policy
after only 9 responses. While per-page policies might seem better, they are
dicult to use since they require knowledge about the content on each page.
As such, some website, e.g. Facebook, use origin-wide policies, motivating
the need for an origin policy delivery method.
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In addition to the comparison between per-page and origin policy, we
also evaluated the cost benets of using our policy simplication algorithm.
Using maximum simplications, i.e. t1 = 1, t2 = 1, the average size of the
origin wide policy decreases from 1904 to 1004 bytes, a decrease of 47%.
Similarly, the per-page policy decreases from 215 bytes to 129 bytes, which
is a 40% decrease. For some websites, the benet of simplication is much
greater. In particular, this is the case when websites allow navigation to nu-
merous subdomains. For example, spravker.ru would require a 20438 byte
origin policy without simplication, but only 61 bytes after simplication.
The big dierence stems from the fact that spravker.ru have 954 subdo-
mains.










We also performed a more in-depth analysis of three websites, ebay.com,
wikipedia.org and stackexchange.com, to see how the threshold aect
performance. Fixing t1 to 0, we only focus on the number of subdomains
when deciding if wildcards should be used. Figure 2.10 shows these domains
as solid lines, together with the corresponding costs for their origin policies.
As can be noted, after the t2 threshold reaches 280 subdomains Wikipedia
can no longer use the wildcard and the policy quickly increases in size. By
increasing t1 to 1000, more URLs are required before simplications can
take place. As can be seen in the dashed lines in Figure 2.10, the crawled
data from Wikipedia did not contain enough URLs to the same domain for
a simplication. This would be the desired behavior if Wikipedia required
high assurance before introducing wildcards.
69
2. AutoNav: Evaluation and Automatization of Web Navigation Policies












Wikipedia (t1 = 0)
Wikipedia (t1 = 1000)
Ebay (t1 = 0)
Ebay (t1 = 1000)
Stackexchange (t1 = 0)
Stackexchange (t1 = 1000)
Figure 2.10: Cost of origin policy for dierent domains and simplication
thresholds. The y-axis shows policy size in bytes and the x-
axis shows the t2 threshold. The legend shows the t1 threshold
6.2 Coverage
While full coverage may be desirable, the goal of AutoNav is to help even if
the coverage is not complete, by providing a useful baseline policy for devel-
opers to build on.
Our coverage was generated similarly to the method used in CSPAuto-
Gen [37]. We generate the policy based on a training set of 80% of the pages
on a domain and then test how well they match the other 20%. We dene U
as the set of URLs in the training set. For the n pages in the validation set,
we check if URLs on the page are covered, i.e. pi ⊆ U , where pi is the set of
all the URLs on page pi . Finally the coverage of a website is calculated as:
c = |{pi :pi⊆U }|n
Using this formula, c is calculated for all the websites that were crawled.
In total 42% of all the websites were fully covered and for 59% of the websites
95% or more were covered. Note that these results come from only crawling
100 pages, deeper crawls can greatly increase this coverage.
7 Related work
Automatic methods for generating CSP policies have been studied before [12,
16, 18, 37]. deDacota by Doupe et al. [12] performs static analysis of ASP.NET
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code in order to separate JavaScript code from data. After the JavaScript has
been separated into les, a CSP policy was generated for the le. AutoCSP
by Fazzini et al. [16] takes a similar approach by analysing server-side code,
PHP in this case. However, AutoCSP uses dynamic taint tracking instead of
static analysis, allowing it to create policies for inline JavaScript events and
CSS code. While both AutoCSP and deDacota were successful, they required
access to the source code of the application. In contrast, AutoNav uses a
black-box approach which removes the need for the source code. Further-
more, the aforementioned methods focus on JavaScript and CSS, while our
focus is on navigation and URLs. In addition, static analysis of source code
will miss many URLs since modern web applications, like WordPress, store
content in the database and not in the code.
In addition, research has been done on generating policies without access
to the source code. Golubovic’s autoCSP [18] method utilizes a reverse proxy
and the report function in CSP to run an application in learning mode. In this
mode, the tool externalizes inline code and generates policies for the scripts
that should be allowed. A drawback is that autoCSP requires manual navi-
gation through the application to ensure all scripts are triggered. While this
works well for scripts, it becomes challenging when all possible links need
to be navigated. A similar approach based on the report function in CSP was
utilized by King’s Firefox extension Laboratory [30]. Laboratory is impres-
sive as it enables users to record and generate CSP policies in real-time while
visiting a website. Starting with a strict policy, it gradually weakens it as vi-
olation reports are received. While this method could be extended to include
navigations, it would require the user to initiate all possible navigations on
each page. Instead of relying on the reporting functionality, our method uses
a combination of static and dynamic analysis to record the navigations a doc-
ument can initiate. By doing this we avoid the problem of having to initiate
all navigations to generate a report. We also improve on the manual aspect
of traversing a website by implementing an automatic crawler, as suggested
by Golubovic, in future works.
CSPAutoGen Pan et al. [37] is also intended to automatize CSP genera-
tion. CSPAutoGen uses a crawler to analyze websites and try to infer which
scripts should be allowed. Similar scripts are also generalized into abstract
syntax trees, based on how many similar scripts are found. Once a policy has
been inferred, CSPAutoGen functions as a proxy between the client and the
server. This enables CSPAutoGen to rewrite requests and responses in real-
time, without needing any CSP congurations on the website. This is a great
feature when a server needs to be secured without any direct modication.
While a similar approach could be used for URLs and navigation, our goal is
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to generate CSP policies that can be used by the server directly.
In addition to policy generation, we benet from origin-wide policies [59].
Similarly to the work on evaluating general origin-wide policies by Van Acker
et al. [50], our results also indicate that an origin-wide policy provides addi-
tional security without degrading performance.
8 Conclusion
Security We have performed a security analysis of the emerging CSP di-
rective navigate-to. Our ndings show that the current specication and
implementations introduce new vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities include
methods for resource probing, login detection, circumventing blockage of
third-party cookies, as well as, history enumeration. To mitigate these prob-
lems we propose countermeasures to both the specication and implemen-
tation of the directive. We demonstrate that the directive triggers vulnerabil-
ities even in websites that do not use the directive in their policies. Thus, we
also propose countermeasures web developers can make to their applications
in order to mitigate the possibilities of being exploited.
Automatization We have evaluated the possibility of automatically gen-
erating policies to help developers adopt the policy, we created AutoNav. Au-
toNav uses a black-box approach to crawl websites and generate CSP policies
that can be directly applied to the website. Our results show that in total 42%
of all the websites were fully covered and for 59% of the websites 95% or more
were covered. We further simplify the process by identifying categories of
websites which the policy better ts. Our research shows that shopping and
adult websites are best covered. These websites have a high incentive to keep
the users on their site, with the exception of linking to sponsors or partners,
which AutoNav’s policies cover.
Performance To analyze the performance of navigate-to we have con-
ducted an empirical study of Alexa’s top 10,000 websites. For each website,
we have crawled 100 pages and based on theses generated policies. We show
that on average this directive would increase the header size by 215 bytes
per request. However, using our simplication algorithm we produce more
maintainable policies which were also 40% smaller on average. Our results in-
dicate that using an origin policy would require a one time cost of 1904 bytes,
or 1004 using simplications, as opposed to 215 bytes per request. Thus we
show that the performance hit from the increased security can be eciently
mitigated by adopting an origin policy with suitable simplications.
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Coordinated disclosure We are in the process of disclosing the discov-
ered vulnerabilities to the aected vendors, including Google where both
Chrome’s implementation of navigate-to directive and the Google Search
website are aected. Based on our recommendations Firefox chose to harden
their implementation against exltration attacks, as explained in Section 4.2.2.
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Abstract. Modern web applications are an integral part of our dig-ital lives. As we put more trust in web applications, the need for
security increases. At the same time, detecting vulnerabilities in web
applications has become increasingly hard, due to the complexity, dy-
namism, and reliance on third-party components. Blackbox vulnerabil-
ity scanning is especially challenging because (i) for deep penetration
of web applications scanners need to exercise such browsing behavior
as user interaction and asynchrony, and (ii) for detection of nontriv-
ial injection attacks, such as stored cross-site scripting (XSS), scanners
need to discover inter-page data dependencies.
This paper illuminates key challenges for crawling and scanning the
modern web. Based on these challenges we identify three core pillars
for deep crawling and scanning: navigation modeling, traversing, and
tracking inter-state dependencies. While prior eorts are largely lim-
ited to the separate pillars, we suggest an approach that leverages all
three. We develop Black Widow, a blackbox data-driven approach to
web crawling and scanning. We demonstrate the eectiveness of the
crawling by code coverage improvements ranging from 63% to 280%
compared to other crawlers across all applications. Further, we demon-
strate the eectiveness of the web vulnerability scanning by featur-
ing no false positives and nding more cross-site scripting vulnerabili-
ties than previous methods. In older applications, used in previous re-
search, we nd vulnerabilities that the other methods miss. We also
nd new vulnerabilities in production software, including HotCRP, os-
Commerce, PrestaShop and WordPress.

1 Introduction
Ensuring the security of web applications is of paramount importance for
our modern society. The dynamic nature of web applications, together with
a plethora of dierent languages and frameworks, makes it particularly chal-
lenging for existing approaches to provide sucient coverage of the existing
threats. Even the web’s main players, Google and Facebook, are prone to
vulnerabilities, regularly discovered by security researchers. In 2019 alone,
Google’s bug bounty paid $6.5 million [16] and Facebook $2.2 million [12],
both continuing the ever-increasing trend. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks,
injecting malicious scripts in vulnerable web pages, represent the lion’s share
of web insecurities. Despite mitigations by the current security practices,
XSS remains a prevalent class of attacks on the web [38]. Google rewards mil-
lions of dollars for XSS vulnerability reports yearly [21], and XSS is presently
the most rewarded bug on both HackerOne [20] and Bugcrowd [5]. This mo-
tivates the focus of this paper on detecting vulnerabilities in web applica-
tions, with particular emphasis on XSS.
Blackbox web scanning: When such artifacts as the source code, models
describing the application behaviors, and code annotations are available, the
tester can use whitebox techniques that look for vulnerable code patterns in
the code or vulnerable behaviors in the models. Unfortunately, these artifacts
are often unavailable in practice, rendering whitebox approaches ineective
in such cases.
The focus of this work is on blackbox vulnerability detection. In con-
trast to whitebox approaches, blackbox detection techniques rely on no prior
knowledge about the behaviors of web applications. This is the standard for
security penetration testing, which is a common method for nding secu-
rity vulnerabilities [31]. Instead, they acquire such knowledge by interacting
with running instances of web applications with crawlers. Crawlers are a cru-
cial component of blackbox scanners that explore the attack surface of web
applications by visiting webpages to discover URLs, HTML form elds, and
other input elds. If a crawler fails to cover the attack surface suciently,
then vulnerabilities may remain undetected, leaving web applications ex-
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posed to attacks.
Unfortunately, having crawlers able to discover in-depth behaviors of
web applications is not sucient to detect vulnerabilities. The detection of
vulnerabilities often requires the generation of tests that can interact with
the web application in non-trivial ways. For example, the detection of stored
cross-site scripting vulnerabilities (stored XSS), a notoriously hard class of
vulnerabilities [38], requires the ability to reason about the subtle dependen-
cies between the control and data ows of web application to identify the
page with input elds to inject the malicious XSS payload, and then the page
that will reect the injected payload.
Challenges: Over the past decade, the research community has proposed
dierent approaches to increase the coverage of the attack surface of web
applications. As JavaScript has rendered webpages dynamic and more com-
plex, new ideas were proposed to incorporate these dynamic behaviors to
ensure a correct exploration of the page behaviors (jÄk [30]) and the asyn-
chronous HTTP requests (CrawlJAX [4, 26]). Similarly, other approaches
proposed to tackle the complexity of the server-side program by reverse en-
gineering (LigRE [10] and KameleonFuzz [11]) or inferring the state (Enemy
of the State [8]) of the server, and then using the learned model to drive a
crawler.
Unfortunately, despite the recent eorts, existing approaches do not oer
sucient coverage of the attack surface. To tackle this challenge, we start
from two observations. First, while prior work provided solutions to indi-
vidual challenges, leveraging their carefully designed combination has the
potential to signicantly improve the state of the art of modern web applica-
tion scanning. Second, existing solutions focus mostly on handling control
ows of web applications, falling short of taking into account intertwined
dependencies between control and data ows. Consider, for example, the de-
pendency between a page to add new users and the page to show existing
users, where the former changes the state of the latter. Being able to extract
and use such an inter-page dependency will allow scanners to explore new
behaviors and detect more sophisticated XSS vulnerabilities.
Contributions: This paper presents Black Widow, a novel blackbox web ap-
plication scanning technique that identies and builds on three pillars: nav-
igation modeling, traversing, and tracking inter-state dependencies.
Given a URL, our scanner creates a navigation model of the web applica-
tion with a novel JavaScript dynamic analysis-based crawler able to explore
both the static structure of webpages, i.e., anchors, forms, and frames, as well
as discover and re JavaScript events such as mouse clicks. Also, our scan-
ner further annotates the model to capture the sequence of steps required
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to reach a given page, enabling the crawler to retrace its steps. When visit-
ing a webpage, our scanner enriches our model with data ow information
using a black-box, end-to-end, dynamic taint tracking technique. Here, our
scanner identies input elds, i.e., taint source, and then probe them with
unique strings, i.e., taint values. Later, the scanner checks when the strings
re-surface in the HTML document, i.e., sinks. Tracking these taints allows
us to understand the dependencies between dierent pages.
We implement our approach as a scanner on top of a modern browser
with a state-of-the-art JavaScript engine. To empirically evaluate it, both
in terms of coverage and vulnerability detection, we test it on two sets of
web applications and compare the results with other scanners. The rst
set of web applications are older well-known applications that have been
used for vulnerability testing before, e.g. WackoPicko and SCARF. The sec-
ond set contains new production applications such as CMS platforms in-
cluding WordPress and E-commerce platforms including PrestaShop and os-
Commerce. From this, we see that our approach improves code coverage by
between 63% and 280% compared to other scanners across all applications.
Across all web applications, our approach improves code coverage by be-
tween 6% and 62%, compared to the sum of all other scanners. In addition,
our approach nds more XSS vulnerabilities in older applications, i.e. phpBB,
SCARF, Vanilla and WackoPicko, that have been used in previous research.
Finally, we also nd multiple new vulnerabilities across production software
including HotCRP, osCommerce, PrestaShop and WordPress.
Finally, while most scanners produce false positives, Black Widow is free
of false positives on the tested applications thanks to its dynamic verication
of code injections.
In summary, the paper oers the following contributions.
• We identify unsolved challenges for scanners in modern web applications
and present them in Section 2.
• We present our novel approaches for nding XSS vulnerabilities using
inter-state dependency analysis and crawling complex workows in Sec-
tion 3.
• We implement and share the source code of Black Widow1
• We perform a comparative evaluation of Black Widow on 10 popular web
applications against 7 web application scanners.
• We present our evaluation in Section 4 showing that our approach nds
25 vulnerabilities, of which 6 are previously unknown in HotCRP, osCom-
merce, PrestaShop and WordPress. Additionally, we nd more vulnerabil-
1 Our implementation is available online on https://www.cse.chalmers.se/research
/group/security/black-widow/
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ities in older applications compared to other scanners. We also improve
code coverage on average by 23%.
• We analyze the results and explain the important features required by web
scanners in Section 5.
2 Challenges
Existing web application scanners suer from a number of shortcomings
aecting their ability to cope with the complexity of modern web applica-
tions [3, 9]. We observe that state-of-the-art scanners tend to focus on sep-
arate challenges to improve their eectiveness. For example, jÄk focuses on
JavaScript events, Enemy of the State on application states, LigRE on reverse
engineering and CrawlJAX on network requests. However, to successfully
scan applications our insight is that these challenges must be solved simul-
taneously. This section focuses on these shortcomings and extracts the key
challenges to achieve high code coverage and eective vulnerability detec-
tion.
High code coverage is crucial for nding any type of vulnerability as the
scanner must be able to reach the code to test it. For vulnerability detection,
we focus on stored XSS as it is known to be dicult to detect and a category
of vulnerabilities poorly covered by existing scanners [3, 9]. Here the server
stores and uses at a later time untrusted inputs in server operations, without
doing proper validation of the inputs or sanitization of output.
A web application scanner tasked with the detection of subtle vulnera-
bilities like stored XSS faces three major challenges. First, the scanner needs
to model the various states forming a web application, the connections and
dependencies between states (Section 2.1). Second, the identication of these
dependencies requires the scanner to be able to traverse the complex work-
ows in applications (Section 2.2). Finally, the scanner needs to track subtle
dependencies between states of the web application (Section 2.3).
2.1 Navigation Modeling
Modern web applications are dynamic applications with an abundance of
JavaScript code, client-side events and server-side statefulness. Modeling the
scanner’s interaction with both server-side and client-side code is compli-
cated and challenging. Network requests can change the state of the server
while clicking a button can result in changes to the DOM, which in turn
generates new links or elds. These orthogonal problems must all be han-
dled by the scanner to achieve high coverage and improved detection rate
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of vulnerabilities. Consider the ow in an example web application in Fig-
ure 3.11. The scanner must be able to model links, forms, events and the in-
teraction between them. Additionally, to enable workow traversal, it must
also model the path taken through the application. Finally, the model must
support inter-state dependencies as shown by the dashed line in the gure.
The state-of-the-art consists of dierent approaches to navigation mod-
eling. Enemy of the State uses a state machine and a directed graph to infer
the server-side state. However, the navigation model lacks information about
client-side events. In contrast, jÄk used a graph with lists inside nodes, to
represent JavaScript events. CrawlJAX moved the focus to model JavaScript
network requests. While these two model client-side, they miss other impor-
tant navigation methods such as form submissions.
A navigation model should allow the scanner to eciently and exhaus-
tively scan a web application. Without correct modeling, the scanner will
miss important resources or spend too much time revisiting the same or sim-
ilar resources. To achieve this, the model must cover a multitude of meth-
ods for interaction with the application, including GET and POST requests,
JavaScript events, HTML form and iframes.
In addition, the model should be able to accommodate dependencies.
Client-side navigations, such as clicking a button, might depend on previous
events. For example, the user might have to hover the menu before being
able to click the button. Similarly, installation wizards can require a set of
forms to be submitted in sequence.
With a solution to the modeling challenge, the next challenge is how the
scanner should use this model, i.e. how should it traverse the model.
2.2 Traversing
To improve code coverage and vulnerability detection, the crawler compo-
nent of the scanner must be able to traverse the application. In particular,
the challenge of reproducing workows is crucial for both coverage and vul-
nerability detection. The challenges of handling complex workows include
deciding in which order actions should be performed and when to perform
possibly state-changing actions, e.g. submitting forms. Also, the workows
must be modeled at a higher level than network requests as simply replay-
ing requests can result in incorrect parameter values, especially for context-
dependent value such as a comment ID. In Figure 3.11, we can observe a
workow requiring a combination of normal link navigation, form submis-
sion and event interaction. Also, note that the forms can contain security
nonces to protect against CSRF attacks. A side eect of this is that the scan-
ner can not replay the request and just change the payload, but has to reload
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the page and resubmit the form.
The current state-of-the-art focuses largely on navigation and exploration
but misses out on global workows. Both CrawlJAX and jÄk focused on ex-
ploring client-side events. By exploring the events in a depth-rst fashion,
jÄk can nd sequences of events that could be exploited. However, these se-
quences do not extend across multiple pages, which will miss out on ows.
Enemy of the State takes the opposite approach and ignores traversing client-
side events and instead focuses on traversing server-side states. To traverse,
they use a combination of picking links from the previous response and a
heuristic method to traverse edges that are the least likely to result in a state
change, e.g. by avoiding form submission until necessary. To change state
they sometimes need to replay the request from the start. Replaying requests
may not be sucient as a form used to post comments might contain a sub-
mission ID or view-state information that changes for each request. Due to
the challenge of reproducing these ows, their approach assumes the power
to reset the full application when needed, preventing the approach from be-
ing used on live applications.
We note that no scanner handles combinations of events and classic page
navigations. Both jÄk and CrawlJAX traverse with a focus on client-side
state while Enemy of the State focus on links and forms for interaction. Sim-
ply combining the two approaches of jÄk and Enemy of the State is not trivial
as their approaches are tailored to their goals. Enemy of the State uses links
on pages to determine state changes, which are not necessarily generated by
events.
Keeping the scanner authenticated is also a challenge. Some scanners
require user-supplied patterns to detect authentication [28, 34, 36]. jÄk au-
thenticates once and then assumes the state is kept, while CrawlJAX ignores
it altogether. Enemy of the State can re-authenticate if they correctly detect
the state change when logging out. Once again it is hard to nd consensus
on how to handle authentication.
In addition to coverage, traversing is important for the fuzzing part of the
scanner. Simply exporting all requests to a standalone fuzzer is problematic
as it results in loss of context. As such, the scanner must place the application
in an appropriate state before fuzzing. Here some scanners take the rather
extreme approach of trying to reset the entire web application before fuzzing
each parameter [8, 10, 11]. jÄk creates a special attacker module that loads
a URL and then executes the necessary events. This shows that in order to
fuzz the application in a correct setting, without requiring a full restart of the




Solving both modeling and traversing should enable the scanner to crawl
the application with improved coverage, allowing it to nd more parameters
to test. The nal challenge, particularly with respect to stored XSS, is map-
ping the dependencies between dierent states in the application.
2.3 Inter-state Dependencies
It is evident that agreeing on a model that ts both client-side and server-side
is hard, yet important. In addition, neither of the previous approaches are
capable of modeling inter-state dependencies or general workows. While
Enemy of the State model states, they miss the complex workows and the
inter-state dependencies. The model jÄk uses can detect workows on pages
but fails to scale for the full application.
A key challenge faced by scanners is how to accurately and precisely
model how user inputs aect web applications. As an example, consider the
web application workow in Figure 3.11 capturing an administrator regis-
tering a new user. In this workow, the administrator starts from the in-
dex page (i.e., index.php) and navigates to the login page (i.e., login.php).
Then, the administrator submits the password and lands on the administrator
dashboard (i.e., admin.php). From the dashboard, the administrator reaches
the user management page (i.e., admin.php#users), and submits the form to
register a new user. Then, the web application stores the new user data in the
database, and, as a result of that, the data of the new user is shown when visit-
ing the page of existing users (i.e., view_users.php). Such a workow shows
two intricate dependencies between two states of the web application: First,
an action of admin.php#users can cause a transition of view_users.php,
and second, the form data submitted to admin.php#users is reected in the
new state of admin.php#users.
To detect if the input elds of the form data are vulnerable to, e.g., cross-
site scripting (XSS), a scanner needs to inject payloads in the form of
admin.php#users and then reach view_users.php to verify whether the
injection was successful. Unfortunately, existing web scanners are not aware
of these inter-state dependencies, and after injecting payloads, they can hardly
identify the page where and whether the injection is reected.
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Figure 3.11: Example of a web application where anyone can see the list of
users and the admin can add new users. The dashed red line
represents the inter-state dependency. Green lines are HTML5
and orange symbolises JavaScript. The dotted blue lines be-
tween edges would be added by our scanner to track its path.
The sequence numbers shown the necessary order to nd the
inter-state dependency.
3 Approach
Motivated by the challenges in Section 2, this section presents our approach
to web application scanning. The three key ingredients of our approach are
edge-driven navigation with path-augmentation, complex workow traver-
sal, and ne-grained inter-state dependency tracking. We explain how we
connect these three parts in Algorithm 1. In addition to the three main pil-
lars, we also include a section about the dynamic XSS detection used in Black
Widow and motivate why false positives are improbable.
Algorithm 1 takes a single target URL as an input. We start by creating
an empty node, allowing us to create an initial edge between the empty node
and the node containing the input URL. The main loop picks an unvisited
edge from the navigation graph and then traverses it, executing the necessary
workows as shown in Algorithm 2. In Algorithm 2, we use the fact that each
edge knows the previous edge. The isSafe function in Algorithm 2 checks
if the type of action, e.g. JavaScript event or form submission, is safe. We
consider a type to be safe if it is a GET request, more about this in Section 3.2.
Once the safe edge is found we navigate the chain of actions. Following this
navigation, the scanner is ready to parse the page. First, we inspect the page
for inter-state dependency tokens and add the necessary dependency edges,
as shown in Algorithm 3. Each token will contain a taint value, explained
more in Section 3.3, a source edge and a sink edge. If a source and sink are
found, our scanner will fuzz the source and check the sink. Afterward, we
extract any new possible navigation resources and add them to the graph.
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Next, we fuzz any possible parameters in the edge and then inject a taint
token. The order is important as we want the token to overwrite any stored
fuzzing value. Finally, the edge is marked as visited and the loop repeats.
The goal of this combination is to improve both vulnerability detection
and code coverage. The three parts of the approach support each other to
achieve this. A strong model that handles dierent navigation methods and
supports augmentation with path and dependency information will enable
a richer interaction with the application. Based on the model we can build
a strong crawler component that can handle complex workow which com-
bines requests and client-side events. Finally, by tracking inter-state depen-
dencies we can improve detection of stored vulnerabilities.
Data: Target url
1 Global: tokens // Used in Algorithm 3




6 while unvisited edge e in navigation do
7 traverse(e); // See Algorithm 2
8 inspectTokens(e, navigation); // See Algorithm 3
9 resources = extract({urls, forms, events, iframes});






15 mark e as visited;
16 end
Algorithm 1: Scanner algorithm
1 Function traverse(e: edge)
2 workflow = []; // List of edges
3 currentEdge = e;
4 while prevEdge = currentEdge.previous do
5 workflow.prepend(currentEdge);
6 if isSafe(currentEdge.type) then
7 break;
8 end




Algorithm 2: Traversal algorithm
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1 Function inspectTokens(e: edge, g: graph)
2 for token in tokens do
3 if pageSource(e) contains token.value then






10 Function injectTokens(e: edge)
11 for parameter in e do
12 token.value = generateToken();
13 token.source = e;
14 tokens.append(token);
15 inject token in parameter;
16 end
17 end
Algorithm 3: Inter-state dependency algorithms
3.1 Navigation Modeling
Our approach is model-based in the sense that it creates, maintains, and uses
a model of the web application to drive the exploration and detection of vul-
nerabilities. Our model covers both server-side and client-side aspects of
the application. The model tracks server-side inter-state dependencies and
workows. In addition, it directly captures elements of the client-side pro-
gram of the web application, i.e., HTML and the state of the JavaScript pro-
gram.
Model Construction Our model is created and updated at run-time while
scanning the web application. Starting from an initial URL, our scanner re-
trieves the rst webpage and the referenced resources. While executing the
loaded JavaScript, it extracts the registered JavaScript events and adds them
to our model. Firing an event may result in changing the internal state of the
JavaScript program, or retrieving a new page. Our model captures all these
aspects and it keeps track of the sequence of red events when revisiting the
web application, e.g., for the detection of vulnerabilities.
Accordingly, we represent web applications with a labeled directed graph,
where each node is a state of the client-side program and edges are the ac-
tion (e.g., click) to move from one state to another one. The state of our
model contains both the state of the page, i.e., the URL of the page, and the
state of the JavaScript program, i.e., the JavaScript event that triggered the
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execution. Then, we use labeled edges for state transitions. Our model sup-
ports four types of actions, i.e., GET requests, form submission, iframes and
JavaScript events. While form submissions normally result in GET or POST
requests, we need a higher-level model for the traversing method explained
in Section 3.2. We consider iframes as actions because we need to model the
inter-document communication between the iframe and the parent, e.g r-
ing an event in the parent might aect the iframe. By simply considering
the iframe source as a separate URL, scanners will miss this interaction. Fi-
nally, we annotate each edge with the previous edge visited when crawling
the web application, as shown in Figure 3.11. Such an annotation will allow
the crawler to reconstruct the paths within the web application, useful infor-
mation for achieving deeper crawling and when visiting the web application
for testing.
Extraction of Actions The correct creation of the model requires the abil-
ity to extract the set of possible actions from a web page. Our approach uses
dynamic analysis approach, where we load a page and execute it in a mod-
ied browser environment, and then we observe the execution of the page,
monitoring for calls to browser APIs to register JavaScript events and modi-
cation of the DOM tree to insert tags such as forms and anchors.
Event Registration Hooking Before loading a page we inject JavaScript which
allows us to wrap functions such as addEventListener and detect DOM ob-
jects with event handlers. We accomplish this by leveraging the JavaScript
libraries developed for the jÄk scanner [30]. While lightweight and easy to
use, in-browser instrumentation is relatively fragile. A more robust approach
could be directly modifying the JavaScript engine or source-to-source com-
pile the code for better analysis.
DOM Modication To detect updates to the page we rescan the page when-
ever we execute an event. This allows us to detect dynamically added items.
Innite Crawls When visiting a webpage, crawlers can enter in an in-
nite loop where they can perform the same operation endlessly. Consider
the problem of crawling an online calendar. When a crawler clicks on the
View next week button, the new page may have a dierent URL and content.
The new page will container again the button View next week, triggering an
innite loop. An eective strategy to avoid innite crawls is to dene (i) a set
of heuristics that determine when two pages or two actions are similar, and
(ii) a hard limit to the maximum number of “similar” actions performed by
the crawler. In our approach, we dene two pages to be similar if they share
the same URL except for the query string and the fragments. For example,
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https://example.domain/path/?x=1 and
https://example.domain/path/?x=2 are similar whereas
https://example.domain/?x=1 and https://example.domain/path/?x=2
are dierent. The hard limit is a conguration parameter of our approach.
3.2 Traversal
To traverse the navigation model we pick unvisited edges from the graph
in the order they were added, akin to breadth-rst search. This allows the
scanner to gain an overview of the application before diving into specic
components. The edges are weighted with a positive bias towards form sub-
mission, which enables this type of deep-dive when forms are detected.
To handle the challenge of session management, we pay extra attention
to forms containing password elds, as this symbolizes an opportunity to
authenticate. Not only does this enable the scanner to re-authenticate but it
also helps when the application generates a login form due to incorrect ses-
sion tokens. Another benet is a more robust approach to complicated login
ows, such as double login to reach the administrator page—we observed
such workow in phpBB, one of the web applications that we evaluated.
The main challenge to overcome is that areas of a web application might
require the user to complete a specic sequence of actions. This could, for
example, be to review a comment after submitting it or submit a sequence
of forms in a conguration wizard. It is also common for client-side code
to require chaining, e.g. hover a menu before seeing all the links or click a
button to dynamically generate a new form.
We devise a mechanism to handle navigation dependencies by modeling
the workows in the application. Whenever we need to follow an edge in the
navigation graph, we rst check if the previous edge is considered safe. Here
we dene safe to be an edge which represents a GET request, similar to the
HTTP RFC [14]. If the edge is safe, we execute it immediately. Otherwise,
we recursively inspect the previous edge until a safe edge is found, as shown
in Algorithm 2. Note that the rst edge added to the navigation graph is al-
ways a GET request, which ensures a base case. Once the safe edge is found,
we execute the full workow of edges leading up to the desired edge. Al-
though the RFC denes GET requests to be idempotent, developers can still
implement state-changing functions on GET requests. Therefore, consider-
ing GET requests as safe is a performance trade-o. This could be deactivated
by a parameter in Black Widow, causing the scanner to traverse back to the
beginning.
Using Figure 3.11 as an example if the crawler needed to submit a form
on admin.php#users then it would rst have to load login.php and then
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submit that form, followed by executing a JavaScript event to dynamically
add the user form.
We chose to only chain actions to the previous GET request, as they are
deemed safe. Chaining from the start is possible, but it would be slow in
practice.
3.3 Inter-state Dependencies
One of the innovative aspects of our approach is to identify and map the ways
user inputs are connected to the states of a web application. We achieve
that by using a dynamic, end-to-end taint tracking while visiting the web
application. Whenever our scanner identies an input eld, i.e., a source, it
will submit a unique token. After that, the scanner will look for the token
when visiting other webpages, i.e., sinks.
Tokens To map source and sinks, we use string tokens. We designed to-
kens to avoid triggering ltering functions or data validation checks. At the
same time, we need tokens with a suciently high entropy to not be mis-
taken for other strings in the application. Accordingly, we generate tokens
as pseudo-random strings of eight lowercase characters e.g. frcvwwzm. This
is what generateToken() does in Algorithm 3. This could potentially be im-
proved by making the tokens context-sensitive, e.g. by generating numeric
tokens or emails. However, if the input is validated to only accept numbers,
for example, then XSS is not possible.
Sources and Sinks The point in the application where the token is in-
jected denes the source. More specically, the source is dened as a tuple
containing the edge in the navigation graph and the exact parameter where
the token was injected. The resource in the web application where the to-
ken reappears denes the sink. All the sinks matching a certain source will
be added to a set which in turn is connected to the source. Similar to the
sources, each sink is technically an edge since they carry more context than
a resource node. Since each source can be connected to multiple sinks, the
scanner needs to check each sink for vulnerabilities whenever a payload is
injected into a source.
In our example in Figure 3.11, we have one source and one connected
sink. The source is the username parameter in the form on the management
page and the sink is the view users page. If more parameters, e.g. email or
signature, were also reected then these would create new dependency edges
in the graph.
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3.4 Dynamic XSS detection
After a payload has been sent, the scanner must be able to detect if the
payload code is executed. Black Widow uses a ne-grained dynamic detec-
tion mechanism, making false positives very improbable. We achieve this
by injecting our JavaScript function xss(ID) on every page. This func-
tion adds ID to an array that our scanner can read. Every payload gener-
ated by Black Widow will try to call this function with a random ID, e.g.
<script>xss(71942203)</script> Finally, by inspecting the array we can
detect exactly which payloads resulted in code execution.
For this to result in a false positive, the web application would have to ac-
tively listen for a payload, extract the ID, and then run our injected xss(ID)
function with a correct ID.
4 Evaluation
In this section, we present the evaluation of our approach and the results
from our experiments. In the next section, we perform an in-depth analysis
of the factors behind the results.
To evaluate the eectiveness of our approach we implement it in our
scanner Black Widow and compare it with 7 other scanners on a set of 10
dierent web applications. We want to compare both the crawling capabili-
ties and vulnerability detection capabilities of the scanners. We present the
implementation details in Section 4.1. The details of the experimental setup
are presented in Section 4.2. To measure the crawling capabilities of the scan-
ners we record the code coverage on each of application. The code coverage
results are presented in Section 4.3. For the vulnerability detection capabili-
ties, we collect the reports from each scanner. We present both the reported
vulnerabilities and the manually veried ones in Section 4.4.
4.1 Implementation
Our prototype implementation follows the approach presented above in Sec-
tion 3. It exercises full dynamic execution capabilities to handle such dy-
namic features of modern applications like AJAX and dynamic code execu-
tion, e.g. eval. To achieve this we use Python and Selenium to control a
mainstream web browser (Chrome). This gives us access to a state-of-the-art
JavaScript engine. In addition, by using a mainstream browser we can be
more certain that the web application is rendered as intended.
We leverage the JavaScript libraries developed for the jÄk scanner [30].
These libraries are executed before loading the page. This allows us to wrap
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Table 3.7: Lines of code (LoC) executed on the server. Each column repre-
sents the comparison between Black Widow and another crawler.
The cells contain three numbers: unique LoC covered by Black
Widow (A\B), LoC covered by both crawlers (A∩B) and unique
LoC covered by the other crawler (B \A). The numbers in bold
highlight which crawler has the best coverage.
Crawler Arachni Enemy jÄk Skipsh w3af Wget ZAP
A \B A∩B B \A A \B A∩B B \A A \B A∩B B \A A \B A∩B B \A A \B A∩B B \A A \B A∩B B \A A \B A∩B B \A
Drupal 35 146 22 870 757 6 365 51 651 20 519 25 198 32 818 5 846 29 873 28 143 937 32 213 25 803 725 32 981 25 035 498 15 610 42 406 2 591
HotCRP 2 416 16 076 948 16 573 1 919 0 6 771 11 721 271 11 295 7 197 31 3 217 15 275 768 16 345 2 147 3 16 001 2 491 24
Joomla 14 573 29 263 1 390 33 335 10 501 621 24 728 19 108 1 079 33 254 10 582 328 12 533 31 303 1 255 33 975 9 861 576 7 655 36 181 1 659
osCommerce 3 919 6 722 172 9 626 1 015 15 4 171 6 470 507 4 964 5 677 110 5 601 5 040 661 6 070 4 571 103 6 722 3 919 209
phpBB 2 822 5 178 492 2 963 5 037 337 3 150 4 850 348 4 643 3 357 72 4 312 3 688 79 4 431 3 569 21 4 247 3 753 65
PrestaShop 105 974 75 924 65 650 157 095 24 803 3 332 155 579 26 319 58 138 732 43 166 1 018 156 513 25 385 3 053 148 868 33 030 118 141 032 40 866 110
SCARF 189 433 12 270 352 5 342 280 2 464 158 5 404 218 6 520 102 2 340 282 2
Vanilla 5 381 9 908 491 6 032 9 257 185 3 122 12 167 536 8 285 7 004 577 8 202 7 087 171 8 976 6 313 18 8 396 6 893 145
WackoPicko 202 566 2 58 710 9 463 305 0 274 494 14 111 657 9 495 273 0 379 389 2
WordPress 8 871 45 345 1 615 35 092 19 124 256 18 572 35 644 579 7 307 46 909 5 114 26 785 27 431 640 37 073 17 143 73 25 732 28 484 781
functions such as addEventListener and detect DOM objects with event
handlers.
4.2 Experimental Setup
In this section, we present the conguration and methodology of our exper-
iments.
CodeCoverage To evaluate the coverage of the scanners we chose to com-
pare the lines of code that were executed on the server during the session.
This is dierent from previous studies [8, 30], which relied on requested URLs
to determine coverage. While comparing URLs is easier, as it does not require
the web server to run in debug mode, deriving coverage from it becomes
harder. URLs can contain random parameter data, like CSRF tokens, that are
updated throughout the scan. In this case, the parameter data has a low im-
pact on the true coverage. Conversely, the dierence in coverage between
main.php?page=news and main.php?page=login can be large. By focus-
ing on the execution of lines of code we get a more precise understanding of
the coverage.
Calculating the total number of lines of code accurately in an application
is a dicult task. This is especially the case in languages like PHP where code
can be dynamically generated server-side. Even if possible, it would not give
a good measure for comparison as much of the code could be unreachable.
This is typically the case for applications that have installation code, which
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is not used after completing it.
Instead of analyzing the fraction of code executed in the web application,
we compare the number of lines of code executed by the scanners. This gives
a relative measure of performance between the scanners. It also allows us to
determine exactly which lines are found by multiple scanners and which lines
are uniquely executed.
To evaluate the code coverage we used the Xdebug [33] module in PHP.
This module returns detailed data on the lines of code that are executed in
the application. Each request to the application results in a separate list of
lines of code executed for the specic request.
Vulnerabilities In addition to code coverage, we also evaluate how good
the scanners are at nding vulnerabilities. This includes how many vulner-
abilities they can nd and how many false positives they generate. While
there are many vulnerability types, our study focuses on both reected and
stored XSS.
To evaluate the vulnerability detection capabilities of the scanners, we
collect and process all the vulnerabilities they report. First, we manually an-
alyze if the vulnerabilities can be reproduced or if they should be considered
false positives. Second, we cluster similar vulnerability reports into a set of
unique vulnerabilities to make a fair comparison between the dierent re-
porting mechanisms in the scanners. We do this because some applications,
e.g. SCARF, can generate an innite number of vulnerabilities by dynami-
cally adding new input elds. These should be clustered together. Classifying
the uniqueness of vulnerabilities is no easy task. What we aim to achieve is
a clustering in which each injection corresponds to a unique line of code on
the server. That is, if a form has multiple elds that are all stored using the
same SQL query then all these should count as one injection. The rationale
is that it would only require the developer to change one line in the server
code. Similarly, for reected injections, we cluster parameters of the same
request together. We manually inspect the web application source code for
each reported true-positive vulnerability to determine if they should be clus-
tered.
Scanners We compare our scanner Black Widow with both Wget [27] for
code coverage reference and 6 state-of-the-art open-source web vulnerability
scanners from both academia and the web security community: Arachni [36],
Enemy of the State [8], jÄk [30], Skipsh [42], w3af [34] and ZAP [28]. We
use Enemy of the State and jÄk as they are state-of-the-art academic black-
box scanners. Skipsh, Wget and w3af are included as they serve as good
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benchmarks when comparing with previous studies [8, 30]. Arachni and
ZAP are both modern open-source scanners that have been used in more
recent studies [19]. Including a pure crawler with JavaScript capabilities,
such as CrawlJAX [26], could serve as a good coverage reference. However,
in this paper we focus on coverage compared to other vulnerability scanners.
We still include Wget for comparison with previous studies. While it would
be interesting to compare our results with commercial scanners, e.g. Burp
Scanner [32], the closed source nature of these tools would make any type
of feature attribute hard.
We congure the scanners with the correct credentials for the web ap-
plication. When this is not possible we change the default credentials of the
application to match the scanner’s default values. Since the scanners have
dierent capabilities, we try to congure them with as similar congurations
as possible. This entails activating crawling components, both static and dy-
namic, and all detection of all types of XSS vulnerabilities.
Comparing the time performance between scanners is non-trivial to do
fairly as they are written in dierent languages and some are sequential while
others run in parallel. Also, we need to run some older ones in VMs for
compatibility reasons. To avoid innite scans, we limit each scanner to run
for a maximum of eight hours.
Figure 3.12: Each bar compares our scanner to one other scanner on a web
application. The bars show three fractions: unique lines we
nd, lines both nd and lines uniquely found by the other scan-
ner.
Web Applications To ensure that the scanners can handle dierent types
of web applications we test them on 10 dierent applications. The appli-
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cations range from reference applications that have been used in previous
studies to newer production-grade applications. Each application runs in a
VM that we can reset between runs to improve consistency.
We divide the applications into two dierent sets. Reference applications
with known vulnerabilities: phpBB (2.0.23), SCARF (2007), Vanilla (2.0.17.10)
and WackoPicko (2018); and modern production-grade applications: Dru-
pal (8.6.15), HotCRP (2.102), Joomla (3.9.6), osCommerce (2.3.4.1), PrestaShop
(1.7.5.1) and WordPress (5.1).
4.3 Code Coverage Results
This section presents the code coverage in each web application by all of
the crawlers. Table 3.7 shows the number of unique lines of code that were
executed on the server. Black Widow has the highest coverage on 9 out of
the 10 web applications.
Using Wget as a baseline Table 3.7 illustrates that Black Widow increases
the coverage by almost 500% in SCARF. Similarly with modern production
software, like PrestaShop, we can see an increase of 256% in coverage com-
pared to Wget. Even when comparing to state-of-the-art crawlers like jÄk
and Enemy of the State we have more than 100% increase on SCARF and 320%
on modern applications like PrestaShop. There is, however, a case where En-
emy of the State has the highest coverage on Drupal. This case is discussed
in more detail in Section 5.1.
While it would be benecial to know how far we are from perfect cover-
age, we avoid calculating a ground truth on the total number of lines of code
for the applications as it is dicult to do in a meaningful way. Simply ag-
gregating the number of lines in the source code will misrepresent dynamic
code, e.g. eval, and count dead code, e.g. installation code.
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Table 3.8: Unique lines our scanner nds (A \U ) compared to the union of
all other scanners (U ).
Application Our scanner Other scanners Improvement
A \U U |A \U |/ |U |
Drupal 4 378 80 213 +5.5%
HotCRP 1 597 18 326 +8.7%
Joomla 5 134 42 443 +12.1%
osCommerce 2 624 9 216 +28.5%
phpBB 2 743 5 877 +46.7%
PrestaShop 95 139 153 452 +62.0%
SCARF 176 464 +37.9%
Vanilla 2 626 14 234 +18.4%
WackoPicko 50 742 +6.7%
WordPress 3 591 58 131 +6.2%
Table 3.9: Comparison of unique lines of code found by our scanner (A \B)
and the other scanners (B \A). Improvement is new lines found
by our scanner divided by the other’s total.
Crawler Our scanner Other scanners Other’s total Improvement
A \B B \A B |A \B|/ |B|
Arachni 179 477 71 489 283 664 +63.3%
Enemy 267 372 25 268 149 548 +178.8%
jÄk 242 066 9 216 158 802 +152.4%
Skipsh 239 064 8 206 160 794 +148.7%
w3af 249 881 7 328 149 099 +167.6%
Wget 289 698 1 405 103 359 +280.3%
ZAP 226 088 5 560 171 124 +132.1%
We also compare Black Widow to the combined eorts of the other scan-
ners to better understand how we improve the state-of-the-art. Table 3.8 has
three columns containing the number of lines of code that Black Widow nds
which none of the others nd, the combined coverage of the others and -
nally our improvement in coverage. In large applications, like PrestaShop,
Black Widow was able to nd 53 266 lines of code that none of the others
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found. For smaller applications, like phpBB, we see an improvement of up to
46.7% compared to the current state-of-the-art.
To get a better understanding of which parts of the application the scan-
ners are exploring, we further compare the overlap in the lines of code be-
tween the scanners. In Table 3.9 we present the number of unique lines of
code Black Widow nd compared to another crawler. The improvement is
calculated as the number of unique lines we nd divided by the total number
of lines the other crawlers nd.
We plot the comparison for all scanners on all platforms in Figure 3.12.
In this gure, each bar represents the fraction of lines of code attributed to
each crawler. At the bottom is the fraction found only by the other crawlers,
in the middle the lines found by both and on top are the results found by
Black Widow. The bars are sorted by the dierence of unique lines found by
Black Widow and the other crawlers. Black Widow nds the highest number
of unique lines of code in all cases except the rightmost, in which Enemy of
the State performed better on Drupal. The exact number can be found in
Table 3.7.
Table 3.10: Number of reported XSS injections by the scanners and the clas-
sication of the injection as either reected or stored.
Crawler Arachni Enemy jÄk Skipsh w3af Widow ZAP
Type R S R S R S R S R S R S R S
Drupal - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
HotCRP - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - -
Joomla - - 8 - - - - - - - - - - -
osCommerce - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 9 -
phpBB - - - - - - - - - - - 32 - -
PrestaShop - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - -
SCARF 31 - - - - - - - 1 - 3 5 - -
Vanilla 2 - - - - - - - - - 1 2 - -
WackoPicko 3 1 2 1 13 - 1 1 1 - 3 2 - -
WordPress - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 - -
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Table 3.11: Number of unique and correct XSS injections by the scanners
and the classication of the injection as either reected or stored.
Crawler Arachni Enemy jÄk Skipsh w3af Widow ZAP
Type R S R S R S R S R S R S R S
Drupal - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
HotCRP - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - -
Joomla - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
osCommerce - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 - -
phpBB - - - - - - - - - - - 3 - -
PrestaShop - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - -
SCARF 3 - - - - - - - 1 - 3 5 - -
Vanilla - - - - - - - - - - 1 2 - -
WackoPicko 3 1 2 1 1 - 1 - 1 - 3 2 - -
WordPress - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 - -
4.4 Code Injection Results
This section presents the results from the vulnerabilities the dierent scan-
ners nd. To be consistent with the terminology used in previous works [8,
30], we dene an XSS vulnerability to be any injected JavaScript code that
results in execution. While accepting JavaScript from users is risky in gen-
eral, some applications, like Wordpress, have features which require exe-
cuting user supplied JavaScript. In Section 5.7 we discuss the impact and
exploitability of the vulnerabilities our scanner nds.
In Table 3.10 we list all the XSS vulnerabilities found by the scanners on
all the applications. The table contains the number of self-reported vulnera-
bilities. After removing the false positives and clustering similar injections,
as explained in Section 4.2, we get the new results in Table 3.11. The results
from Table 3.11 show that Black Widow outperforms the other scanners on
both the reference applications and the modern applications. In total, Black
Widow nds 25 unique vulnerabilities, which is more than 3 times as many as
the second-best scanner. Of these 25, 6 are previously unknown vulnerabili-
ties in modern applications. We consider the remaining 19 vulnerabilities to
be known for the following reasons. First, all WackoPicko vulnerabilities are
implanted by the authors and they are all known by design. Second, SCARF
has been researched thoroughly and vulnerabilities may be already known.
We conservatively assumed the eight vulnerabilities to be known. Third, the
vulnerabilities on phpBB and Vanilla were xed in their newest versions.
It is important to note we did not miss any vulnerability that the others
103
3. Black Widow: black-box Data-driven Web Scanning
found. However, there were cases where both Black Widow and other scan-
ners found the same vulnerability but by injecting dierent parameters. We
explore these cases more in Section 5.6. Furthermore, Black Widow is the
only scanner that nds vulnerabilities in the modern web applications.
4.5 Takeaways
We have shown that our scanner can outperform the other scanners in terms
of both code coverage and vulnerability detection. Figure 3.12 and Table 3.7
show that we outperform the other scanners in 69 out of 70 cases. Addi-
tionally, Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 show we improve code coverage by between
63% and 280% compared to the other scanners and by between 6% and 62%,
compared to the sum of all other scanners. We also improve vulnerability
detection, as can be seen in Table 3.10 and Table 3.11. Not only do we match
the other scanners but we also nd new vulnerabilities in production appli-
cations.
In the next section, we will analyze these results closer and conclude
which features allowed us to improve coverage and vulnerability detection.
We also discuss what other scanners did better than us.
5 Analysis of Results
The results from the previous section show that the code coverage of our
scanner outperforms the other ones. Furthermore, we nd more code in-
jections and in particular more stored XSS. In this section, we analyze the
factors which led to our advantage. We also analyze where and why the
other scanners performed worse.
Since we have access to the executed lines of code we can closely ana-
lyze the path of the scanner through the application. We utilize this to ana-
lyze when the scanners miss injectable parameters, what values they submit,
when they fail to access parts of the application and how they handle ses-
sions.
We start by presenting interesting cases from the code coverage evalu-
ation in Section 5.1, followed by an analysis of the reported vulnerabilities
from all scanners in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, we discuss the injections our
scanner nds and compare it with what the others nd. In Section 5.4, we
perform two case studies of vulnerabilities that only our scanner nds and
which requires both workow traversal and dependency analysis. Finally, in
Section 5.5, we extract the crucial features for nding injections based on all
vulnerabilities that were found.
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5.1 Coverage Analysis
As presented in Section 4.3, Black Widow improved code coverage, compared
to the aggregated result of all the other scanners, ranged from 5.5% on Drupal
to 62% on PrestaShop. Comparing the code coverage to each scanner, Black
Widow’s improvement ranged from 63.3% against Arachni to 280% against
Wget. In this section, we analyze the factors pertaining to code coverage by
inspecting the performance of the dierent scanners. To better understand
our performance we divide the analysis into two categories. We look at both
cases where we have low coverage compared to the other scanners and cases
where we have high relative coverage.
Low coverage As shown in Figure 3.12, Enemy of the State is the only
scanner that outperforms Black Widow and this is specically on Drupal.
Enemy of the State high coverage on Drupal is because it keeps the authen-
ticated session state by avoiding logging out. The reason Black Widow lost
the state too early was two-fold. First, we use a heuristic algorithm, as ex-
plained in Section 3.2 to select the next edge and unfortunately the logout
edge was picked early. Second, due to the structure of Drupal, our scanner
did not manage to re-authenticate. In particular, this is because, in contrast
to many other applications, Drupal does not present the user with a login
form when they try to perform an unauthorized operation. To isolate the
reason for the lower code coverage, we temporarily blacklist the Drupal lo-
gout function in our scanner. This resulted in our scanner producing similar
coverage to Enemy of the State, ensuring the factor behind the discrepancy
is session handling.
Skipsh performs very well on WordPress, which seems surprising since
it is a modern application that makes heavy use of JavaScript. However,
WordPress degrades gracefully without JavaScript, allowing scanners to nd
multiple pages without using JavaScript. Focusing on static pages can gener-
ate a large coverage but, as is evident from the detected vulnerabilities, does
not imply high vulnerability detection.
High coverage Enemy of the State also performs worse against Black Widow
on osCommerce and HotCRP. This is because Enemy of the State is seemingly
entering an innite loop, using 100% CPU without generating any requests.
This could be due to an implementation error or because the state inference
becomes too complicated in these applications.
Although Black Widow performs well against Wget, Wget still nds some
unique lines, which can seem surprising as it has previously been used as a
reference tool [8, 30]. Based on the traces and source code, we see that most
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of the unique lines of code Wget nds are due to state dierences, e.g. visiting
the same page Black Widow nds but while being unauthenticated.
5.2 False positives and Clustering
To better understand the reason behind the false positives, and be transparent
about our clustering, we analyze the vulnerabilities reported in Table 3.10.
For each scanner with false positives, we reect on the reasons behind the
incorrect classication and what improvements are required. We do not in-
clude w3af in the list as it did not produce any false positives or required any
clustering.
a) Arachni reports two reected XSS vulnerabilities in Vanilla. The
injection point was a Cloudare cookie used on the online support forum for
the Vanilla web application. The cookie is never used in the application and
we were unable to reproduce the injection. In addition, Arachni nds 31 XSS
injections on SCARF. Many of these are incorrect because Arachni reuses
payloads. For example, by injecting into the title of the page, all successive
injection will be label as vulnerable.
b) Enemy of the State claims the discovery of 8 reected XSS vulner-
abilities on Joomla. However, after manual analysis, none of these result
in code execution. The problem is that Enemy of the State interprets the re-
ected payload as an executed payload. It injects, eval(print "[random]"),
into a search eld and then detects that "[random]" is reected. It incor-
rectly assumes this is because eval and print were executed. For this rea-
son, we consider Enemy of the State to nd 0 vulnerabilities on Joomla.
c) jÄk reports 13 vulnerabilities on WackoPicko. These 13 reports
were dierent payloads used to attack the search parameter. After applying
our clustering method, we consider jÄk to nd one unique vulnerability.
d) BlackWidow nds 32 stored vulnerabilities on phpBB. Most of these
parameters are from the conguration panel and are all used in the same
database query. Therefore, only 3 can be considered unique. Two parame-
ters on PrestaShop are used in the same request, thus only one is considered
unique. Black Widow did not produce any false positives thanks to our dy-
namic detection method explained in section 3.4
e) Skipsh claims the detection of a stored XSS in WackoPicko in
the image data parameter when uploading an image. However, the injected
JavaScript could not be executed. Interesting to note is that Skipsh was able
to inject JavaScript into the guestbook but was not able to detect it.
f) ZAP claims to nd 9 reected XSS injection on osCommerce. They
are all variations of injecting javascript:alert(1) into the parameter of
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a link. Since it was just part of a parameter and not a full URL, the JavaScript
code will never execute. Thus, all 9 injections were false positives.
5.3 What We Find
In this section, we present the XSS injections our scanner nds in the dif-
ferent applications. We also extract the important features which made it
possible to nd them.
HotCRP: Reected XSS in bulk user upload The admin can upload a
le with users to add them in bulk. The name of the le is then reected on
the upload page. To nd this, the scanner must be able to follow a complex
workow that makes heavy use of JavaScript, as well as handle le parame-
ters. It is worth noting that the lename is escaped on other pages in HotCRP
but missed in this case.
osCommerce; Stored and reectedXSS Admins can change the tax classes
in osCommerce and two parameters are not correctly ltered, resulting in
stored XSS vulnerabilities. The main challenge to nd this vulnerability was
to nd the injection point as this required us to interact with a navigation
bar that made heavy use of JavaScript.
We also found three vulnerable parameters on the review page. These
parameters were part of a form and their types were radio and hidden. This
highlights that we still inject all parameters, even if they are not intended to
be changed.
phpBB; Multiple Stored XSS in admin backend Admins can change
multiple dierent application settings on the conguration page, such as
ooding interval for posts and max avatar le size. On a separate page, they
can also change the rank of the admin to a custom title. In total, this results
in 32 vulnerable parameters that can be clustered to 3 unique ones. These
require inter-state dependency analysis to solve. Once a setting is changed,
the admin is met with a “Successful update” message, which does not reect
the injection. Thus, the dependency must be found to allow for successful
fuzzing.
PrestaShop; Reected XSS in admin dashboard The admin dashboard
allows the admin to specify a date range for showing statistics. Two pa-
rameters in this form are not correctly ltered and result in a reected XSS.
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Finding these requires a combination of modeling JavaScript events and han-
dling workows. To nd this form the scanner must rst click on a button
on the dashboard.
SCARF; StoredXSS in comments There are many vulnerabilities in SCARF,
most are quite easy to nd. Instead of mentioning all, we focus on one that
requires complex workows, inter-state dependencies and was only found
by us. The message eld in the comment section of conference papers is
vulnerable. What makes it hard to nd is the traversing and needed before
posting the comment and the inter-state dependency analysis needed to nd
the reection. The scanner must rst create a user, then create a conference,
after which it can upload a paper that can be commented on.
Vanilla; Stored and reected XSS The language tag for the RSS feed is
vulnerable and only reected in the feed. Note that the feed is served as
HTML, allowing JavaScript to execute. There is also a stored vulnerability in
the comment section which can be executed by saving a comment as a draft
and then viewing it. Both of these require inter-state dependency analysis
to nd the connecting between language settings and RSS feeds, as well as
posting comments and viewing drafts.
Black Widow also found a reected XSS title parameter in the congura-
tion panel that was vulnerable. Finding this mainly required and modeling
JavaScript and forms.
WackoPicko; Multi-step stored XSS We found all the known XSS vul-
nerabilities [7], except the one requiring ash as we consider it out-of-scope.
We also found a non-listed XSS vulnerability in the reection of a SQL error.
Most notably we were able to detect the multi-step XSS vulnerability that no
other scanner could. This was thanks to both inter-state dependency track-
ing and handling workows. We discuss this in more detail in the case study
in Section 5.4.1.
WordPress; Stored and reected XSS The admin can search for nearby
events using the admin dashboard. The problem is that the search query is
reected, through AJAX, for the text-to-speech functionality. Finding this
requires modeling of both JavaScript events, network requests and forms.
Our scanner also found that by posting comments from the admin panel
JavaScript is allowed to run on posts. For this, the scanner must handle
the workows needed to post the comments and the inter-state dependency
analysis needed to later nd the comment on a post.
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5.4 Case Studies
In this section, we present two in-depth case studies of vulnerabilities that
highlights how and why our approach nds vulnerabilities the other scan-
ners do not. We base our analysis on server-side traces, containing the exe-
cuted lines of code, generated from the scanner sessions. By manually ana-
lyzing the source code of an application we can determine the exact lines of
code that need to be executed for an injection to be successful.
The cases we use are the comment section in WackoPicko and the cong-
uration panel in phpBB. As we have shown, Black Widow can nd vulnera-
bilities in more complex modern web applications. Nevertheless, these cases
allow us to limit the number of factors when comparing our approach with
the other scanners. Since WackoPicko and phpBB have been used in previous
studies [8, 30] they also serve as a level playing eld for all scanners.
5.4.1 Comments on WackoPicko
WackoPicko has a previously unsolved multistep XSS vulnerability that no
other scanner has been able to nd. The dicultly of nding and exploiting
is the need for correctly reproducing a specic workow. After submitting a
comment via a form the user needs to review the comment. While review-
ing, the user can choose to either delete the comment or add it. If, however,
the user decided to visit another page, before adding or deleting, then the
review form will be removed and the user will have to resubmit the com-
ment before reviewing it again. Thus, the steps that must be taken are: Find
an image to comment on (view.php#50, i.e. line 50 in view.php), Post a
comment (preview_comment.php#54), Accept the comment while review-
ing (view.php#53) In Table 3.12 we note that two scanners are able to nd
the input but not exploit it.
Both Enemy of the State and Arachni managed to post a comment but
neither could exploit the vulnerability. Enemy of the State was able to post
a comment containing an empty string but the fuzzing was unsuccessful.
Arguably, Arachni made it a bit further since it was able to inject an XSS
payload. However, the payload was not detected and reported. Enemy of the
State’s shortcoming is that it fuzzes the forms independently while Arachni’s
shortcoming is that it forgets it’s own injection.
jÄk and ZAP had problems nding the rst step, i.e. viewing the pictures,
because the login form breaks the HTML standard by putting a form inside a
table [41]. We avoid this by using a modern browser to parse the web page.
This allows Black Widow to view the web page as the developer intended,
assuming they tested it in a modern browser
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Both w3af and Skipsh were able to nd the pictures but not able to post
the comment. w3af because it could not model the textarea in the form.
Skipsh, on the other hand, does not have this problem. We believe that
Skipsh logged out after seeing the picture but before posting the comment.
The data shows that Skipsh does not try to log in multiple times. In com-
parison, we correctly handle the textarea allowing us to post comments. At
the same time, we also try to log in multiple times if presented with a login
form. This mitigates losing the session forever at an early stage.
To solve this challenge Black Widow needs to combine the modeling of
form elements, handle workows and use inter-state dependency analysis to
correctly inject and detect the vulnerability.
Table 3.12: Steps to recreate the vulnerability in WackoPicko. The columns
contain the le name and line of code for each step.
Crawler view.php#50 preview_comment.php#54 view.php#53 Exploit
Arachni X X X




Widow X X X X
ZAP
5.4.2 Conguration on phpBB
The conguration panel on phpBB has multiple code injection possibilities.
To nd these the crawler must overcome two challenges. First, to reach the
admin panel requires two logins, the rst to authenticate as a user and then
again, with the same credentials, to authenticate as an administrator. Sec-
ond, the injected parameter is not reected on the same page. To detect this
injection inter-state dependency analysis is required. The steps needed to
nd the vulnerability is, log in as admin (admin/index.php#28), nd the
vulnerable form (admin_board.php#34), successfully update the database
(admin_board.php#74) nd the reection (admin_board.php#34).
As shown in Table 3.13, none of the other scanners managed to access
the conguration panel. This is because phpBB requires a double login.
Arachni, jÄk, Skipsh, w3afand ZAP all require user-supplied credentials to-
gether with parameters before running. Based on the traces they do not try
these credentials on the admin login form, only the rst login form. Enemy
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of the State, on the other hand, tries the standard username and password
scanner1. This was enough to log in but it did not manage to log in as an
admin.
Our scanner solves the double login by being consistent with the values
we submit. This allows us to both authenticate as a user and then also as an
admin when presented with the login prompt. After submitting the form in
conguration panel with our taint tokens and later revisiting it, we detect
the inter-state dependency and can fuzz the source and sink.
Table 3.13: Steps to recreate the vulnerability in phpBB. The columns con-




















Widow X X X X X
ZAP
5.5 Features Aribution
In this section, we identify and attribute the key features that contributed to
nding the vulnerabilities in the web applications.
In particular, we try to determine the impact of our modeling, traversing
and inter-state dependency analysis techniques. Below are the denitions
we use in Table 3.14.
Modeling Modeling is considered to contribute if a combination of HTML
forms and JavaScript events were used to nd the code injection.
Traversal Workow traversal contributes if the point of injection depends
on a previous state. This could, for example, be a form submission, a click of
a button or some other DOM interaction.
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Inter-state dependency A code injection is dened to need inter-state
dependency analysis if the point of reection is dierent from the point of
injection.
Table 3.14 shows the 25 unique code injections from the evaluation. Of
these, modeling contributed to 4, workow traversal contributed to 9, and
inter-state dependency analysis contributed to 13. In total, at least one of
them was a contributor in 16 unique injections. The remaining 9 were usually
simpler. Four of them were from WackoPicko where the results of injection
were directly reected. SCARF had 3 directly reected injections and osCom-
merce had 2. It is clear, especially for unique vulnerabilities, that modeling,
workow traversal and inter-state dependency analysis plays an important
role in detecting stored XSS vulnerabilities.
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Table 3.14: For each of the vulnerabilities we note contributing features,
i.e. modeling, workow reproduction or inter-state dependency
(ISD) analysis. We also present if they were uniquely detected
by Black Widow.
Id Application Description Model Workow ISD Unique
1 HotCRP User upload X X X
2 osCommerce Review rating X
3 osCommerce Tax class X
4 phpBB Admin ranks X X
5 phpBB Conguration X X
6 phpBB Site name X X
7 PrestaShop Date X X X
8 SCARF Add session X X X
9 SCARF Comment X X X
10 SCARF Conference name
11 SCARF Edit paper X X X
12 SCARF Edit session
13 SCARF Delete comment X X X
14 SCARF General options
15 SCARF User options X
16 Vanilla Comment draft X X
17 Vanilla Locale X X
18 Vanilla Title banner X X
19 WackoPicko Comment
20 WackoPicko Multi-step X X X
21 WackoPicko Picture
22 WackoPicko Search
23 WackoPicko SQL error
24 WordPress Comment X X X
25 WordPress Nearby event X X X X
5.6 Missed by Us
Out of the 25 unique injections found by all scanners, we also nd all 25.
There was, however, an instance where Arachni found a vulnerability by in-
jecting a dierent parameter than we did. This does not constitute a unique
vulnerability due to our clustering, which we explain in Section 4.4. On
113
3. Black Widow: black-box Data-driven Web Scanning
SCARF, input elements can be dynamically generated by adding more users.
The input names will simply be 1_name, 2_name, etc. Arachni managed to
add multiple users by randomizing email addresses. Since our crawler is fo-
cused on consistency, we do not generate valid random email addresses and
could therefore not add more than one user.
The drawback, as we have discussed is that is it easier to lose the state if
too much randomness is used. A possible solution to this could be to keep
two sets of default values and always test both when possible. There is still
the risk that using multiple users can result in mixing up the state between
them. It would also introduce a performance penalty as multiple submissions
for each form would be required.
The w3af scanner was able to nd a reected version of a vulnerable
parameter that we considered to be stored. In this particular case on SCARF,
it was possible to get a direct reection by submitting the same password
and retype password in the user settings. This is what w3af did. Our scanner
injected unique values into each eld, resulting in an error without reection,
however, the elds were still stored. Inter-state dependency analysis was
used to detect these stored values when revisiting the user settings.
Further possible improvements include updating our method for deter-
mining safe requests and more robust function hooking. A machine learning
approach, such as Mitch [6], could be used to determine if a request can
be considered safe. The function hooking could be done by modifying the
JavaScript engine instead of instrumenting JavaScript code.
5.7 Vulnerability Exploitability
For the six new vulnerabilities, we further investigate the impact and ex-
ploitability. While all of these vulnerabilities were found using an admin
account in the web application, the attacker does not necessarily need to be
an admin. In fact, XSS payloads executed as the admin gives a higher impact
as the JavaScript runs with admin privileges. What the attacker needs to do
is usually to convince the admin to click on a link or visit a malicious website,
i.e. the attacker does not require any admin privileges. Although, there might
be an XSS vulnerability in the code, i.e. user input being reected, there are
orthogonal mitigations such as CSRF tokens and CSP that can decrease the
exploitability.
To exploit the HotCRP vulnerability the attacker would have to guess a
CSRF token, which is considered dicult. Similarly, PrestaShop has a persis-
tent secret in the URL which would have to be known by the attacker. One
of the WordPress vulnerabilities was a self-XSS, meaning the admin would
need to be convinced to, in this case, input our payload string, while the other
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one required a CSRF token. Finally, osCommerce required no CSRF tokens
making it both high impact and easy to exploit.
5.8 Coordinated Disclosure
We have reported the vulnerabilities to the aected vendors, following the
best practices of coordinated disclosure [15]. Specically, we reported a total
of six vulnerabilities to HotCRP, osCommerce, PrestaShop and WordPress.
So far our reports have resulted in HotCRP patching their vulnerabil-
ity [24]. A parallel disclosure for the same vulnerability was reported to
PrestaShop and is now tracked as CVE-2020-5271 [1]. Due to the diculty of
exploitation, WordPress did not consider them vulnerabilities. However, the
nearby event vulnerability is xed in the latest version. We have not received
any conrmation from osCommerce yet.
6 Related Work
This section discusses related work. Automatic vulnerability scanning has
been a popular topic due to its complexity and practical usefulness. This
paper focuses on blackbox scanning, which requires no access to the appli-
cation’s source code or any other input from developers. We have evalu-
ated our approach with respect to both community-developed open-source
tools [28, 34, 36] and academic blackbox scanners [8, 30]. There are also
earlier works on vulnerability detection and scanning [2, 10, 11, 17, 23, 35].
While we focus on blackbox testing, there is also progress on whitebox se-
curity testing [13, 18, 22, 25, 39].
As previous evaluations [3, 9, 29, 37, 40] show, detecting stored XSS is
hard. A common notion is that it is not the exact payload that is the problem
for scanners but rather crawling deep enough to nd the injections, as well as,
model the application to nd the reections. Similar to our ndings, Parvez et
al. [29] note that while some scanners were able to post comments to pictures
in WackoPicko, something which requires multiple actions in sequence, none
of them was able to inject a payload.
We now discuss work that addresses server-side state, client-side state,
and tracking data dependencies.
Server-side state Enemy of the State [8] focuses on inferring the state of
the server by using a heuristic method to compare how requests result in dif-
ferent links on pages. Black Widow instead takes the approach of analyzing
the navigation methods to infer some state information. For example, if the
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previous edge in the navigation graph was a form submission then we would
have to resubmit this form before continuing. This allows us to execute se-
quences of actions without fully inferring the server-side state.
One reason many of the other scanners pay little attention to server-side
state is to prioritize performance from concurrent requests. Skipsh [42] is
noteworthy for its high performance in terms of requests per second. One
method they use to achieve this is making concurrent requests. Concurrent
requests can be useful in a stateless environment since the requests will not
interfere with each other. ZAP [28], w3af [34] and Arachni [36] take the same
approach as Skipsh and use concurrent requests in favor of better state con-
trol. Since our traversing method relies on executing a sequence of possibly
state-changing action we need to ensure that no other state-changing re-
quests are sent concurrently. For this reason, our approach only performs
actions in serial.
Client-side state jÄk considers client-side events to improve exploration.
The support for events is however limited, leaving out such events as form
submission. While other scanners like Enemy of the State, w3af, and ZAP
execute JavaScript, they do not model the events. This limits their ability
to explore the client-side state. As modern applications make heavy use of
JavaScript, Black Widow oers fully-edged support of client-side events.
In contrast to jÄk, Black Widow models client-side events like any other
navigation method. This means that we do not have to execute the events in
any particular order which allows us to chain them with other navigations
such as form submissions.
Tracking data dependencies Tracking payloads is an important part of
detecting stored XSS vulnerabilities. Some scanners, including Arachni, use
a session-based ID in each payload. Since the ID is based on the session this
can lead to false positives as payloads are reused for dierent parameters. jÄk
and Enemy of the State use unique IDs for their payload but forgets them on
new pages. w3af uses unique payloads and remembers them across pages.
ZAP uses a combination in which a unique ID is sent together with a generic
payload but in separate requests. This works if both the ID and payload are
stored on a page. In addition to using unique IDs for all our payloads, Black
Widow incorporates the inter-state dependencies in the application to ensure
that we can fuzz the correct input and output across dierent pages.
LigRE [10], and its successor KameleonFuzz [11] use a blackbox approach
to reverse engineering the application and apply a genetic algorithm to mod-
ify the payloads. While they also use tainting inside the payloads to track
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them, we use plaintext tokens to avoid lters destroying the taints. While
Black Widow works on live applications, KameleonFuzz requires the ability
to reset the application. Unfortunately, neither LigRE nor KameleonFuzz are
open-source, which has hindered us from their experimental evaluation.
7 Conclusion
We have put a spotlight on key challenges for crawling and scanning the
modern web. Based on these challenges, we have identied three core pillars
for deep crawling and scanning: navigation modeling, traversing, and track-
ing inter-state dependencies. We have presented Black Widow, a novel ap-
proach to blackbox web application scanning that leverages these pillars by
developing and combining augmented navigation graphs, workow traver-
sal, and inter-state data dependency analysis. To evaluate our approach, we
have implemented it and tested it on 10 dierent web applications and against
7 other web application scanners. Our approach results in code coverage im-
provements ranging from 63% to 280% compared to other scanners across
all tested applications. Across all tested web applications, our approach im-
proved code coverage by between 6% and 62%, compared to the sum of all
other scanners. When deployed to scan for cross-site scripting vulnerabil-
ities, our approach has featured no false positives while uncovering more
vulnerabilities than the other scanners, both in the reference applications,
i.e. phpBB, SCARF, Vanilla and WackoPicko, and in production software,
including HotCRP, osCommerce, PrestaShop and WordPress.
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The following command was used to run Arachni.




The following command was used to run Black Widow.
1 python3 crawl.py [url]
3..1.3 Enemy of the State
First we changed the username and password in the web application to scan-
ner1 then we ran the following command.
1 jython crawler2.py [url]
3..1.4 jÄk
We updated the example.py le with the URL and user data.
1 url = [url]
2 user = User("[sessionName]", 0, url, login_data = {"[userField]": "[
username]", "[passField]": "[password]"}, session="ABC")
3..1.5 Skipsh
The following command was used to run Skipsh.
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For w3af we used the following settings, generic and xss for the audit plugin,
web_spider for crawl plugin and generic (with all credentials) for the auth
plugin.
3..1.7 Wget
The following command was used to run Wget.
1 wget -rp -w 0 waitretry=0 -nd --delete-after --execute robots=off [url
]
3..1.8 ZAP
For ZAP we used the automated scan with both traditional spider and ajax
spider. In the Scan Progress window we deactivated everything that was not
XSS. Similar to Enemy of the State, we changed the credentials in the web
application to the scanner’s default, i.e. ZAP.
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